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EARLY SPECULATIVE BUBBLES 
AMD INCREASES IN THE 
SUPPLY OP MONEY
This paper examines three episodes in economic history that 
are commonly referred to as "speculative bubbles." The three 
bubbles analyzed are: Tulipmania, the Mississippi Bubble and the 
South Sea Bubble. The paper views these three events in a 
historical context emphasizing the monetary interventions 
particular to each episode.
The Rational Expectations and Keynesian school's treatments of 
speculative bubbles are considered and rejected. The life and 
monetary theories of John Law are examined extensively, given his 
influence over the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles. Law is also 
indirectly connected to the Tulipmania, having been influenced by 
the operation of the Bank of Amsterdam.
The conclusion of the thesis is that speculative bubbles are 
engendered by increases in the supply of money, with future bubbles 
being inevitable given fractional reserve banking and Keynesian 
monetary policies. The reason for the malinvestments caused by 
monetary interventions is illuminated by the Austrian trade cycle 
theory.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Speculative bubbles have occurred throughout history. These 
episodes are characterized by a continuous sharp rise in the 
price of a particular asset or group of related assets, 
leading to further price increases driven by new speculators, 
seeking profits through even higher prices. These higher 
prices are driven by the potential profits to be made through 
trading, rather than the earning capacity or economic value of 
the asset. These speculative manias then come to abrupt and 
dramatic endings, as expectations change and buyers quickly 
become sellers, in mass. The consequences are often 
disastrous, with the ensuing crash inflicting financial pain 
on the region or country involved. Euphoria turns to despair 
as the mandatory readjustment that takes place in the economy 
creates massive worker dislocation, and great numbers of 
bankruptcies.
Contemporary economist's views concerning speculative 
bubbles vary. The rational expectations school questions 
whether speculative bubbles can happen at all, given rational 
markets. Kindleberger (1987, 281) concisely gives the
rational expectations viewpoint.
2
Rational expectations theory holds that prices are 
formed within the limits of available information 
by market participants using standard economic 
models appropriate to the circumstances. As such, 
it is claimed, market prices cannot diverge from 
fundamental values unless the information proves to 
have been widely wrong. The theoretical literature 
uses the assumption of the market having one mind 
and one purpose,....
History tells a different story, of course. Market
speculators at various times in history have bid up prices to
extraordinary levels, not based upon fundamental values, but
with the expectation of selling the asset in question at an
even higher price and thus making a profit. This is sometimes
referred to as the "greater fool theory."
John Maynard Keynes spends an entire chapter (chapter 12)
of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
discussing speculation and bubbles, pointing to five factors
which foster these episodes: 1) neophyte investors owning an
increased proportion of capital investment; 2) the day-to-
day price fluctuations having an excessive influence over the
market; 3) violent changes in the mass psychology of ignorant
individuals changing asset valuations; 4) professional
investors devoting their skills to "anticipating what average
opinion expects the average opinion to be;" and 5) confidence,
or lack of, in the credit markets (1964, 153-58).
Keynes (1964, 155-56) metaphorically describes
speculative markets:
Nor is it necessary that anyone should keep his 
simple faith in the conventional basis of valuation 
having any genuine longterm validity. For it is, 
so to speak, a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of
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Musical Chairs-a pastime in which he is victor who 
says Snap neither too soon nor too late, who passes 
the Old Maid to his neighbor before the game is 
over, who secures a chair for himself when the 
music stops.
Keynes (1964, 159) also touches upon the consequences of
speculative bubbles and manias.
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady 
stream of enterprise. But the position is serious 
when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool 
of speculation. When the capital development of a 
country becomes a by-product of the activities of a 
casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.
Ironically, it is due to a Keynesian economic policy and
its monetary apparatus, i.e., that of expanding the supply of
money to increase economic activity, that speculative price
bubbles and manias are engendered. This was exemplified by
John Law, whose System (driven by a huge increase in the
supply of money) created the Mississippi Bubble in France.
Law, who preceded Keynes by two hundred years, held many of
the same views as Keynes. As Charles Rist (quoted in Salerno
1991, 1-2) explains:
It is said that history repeats itself. One can 
say the same thing about economists. At the 
present time there is a writer whose ideas have 
been repeated since Keynes, without ever being 
cited by name. He is called John Law. I would be 
curious to know how many, among the Anglo-Saxon 
authors who have found again, all by themselves, 
his principal arguments, have taken the trouble to 
read him.
However, there are economists who do not feel the 
episode in early eighteenth century France was a bubble. As 
Peter Garber (1990, 46-47) writes:
That Law's promised expansion never materialized
does not imply that a bubble occurred in the modern 
sense of the word. After all, this was not the 
last time that a convincing economic idea would 
fracture in practice. One respectable group of 
modern economists or another have described 
Keynesian economics, supply side economics, 
monetarism, fixed exchange rate regimes, floating 
exchange rate regimes, and the belief in rational 
expectations in asset markets as disastrously 
flawed policy schemes. Indeed, elements of the 
first three were primary components in Law's 
scheme.
Other contemporary economists pursue the explanation of 
speculative bubbles through mathematical formulas. It is not 
surprising that this search for empirical evidence has 
produced nothing that aids in our understanding of these 
episodes. The tools of econometrics were designed to explain 
the movement of lifeless particles, not the activities of 
humans, who act with purpose to improve their condition in 
life. In a recent article by Robert Flood and Robert Hodrick 
(1990, 85), it is pointed out that "academic economists
conducted relatively little formal empirical analysis of 
actual markets until recently, probably because economist's 
analytical and statistical tools were inadequate." Messrs. 
Flood and Hodrick (1990, 86) go on to pursue the case that: 
"The widespread adoption of the rational expectations 
hypothesis provided the required underpinning for theoretical 
and empirical study of the issues." But, as was pointed out 
above, those in the rational expectations school, through 
their belief that all market participants can foretell the 
future, and thus only act rationally, virtually rule out the 
potential for speculative bubbles. Unsurprisingly, after
surveying the current empirical literature concerning bubbles, 
Flood and Hodrick (1990, 99) come to the conclusion that: "The 
current empirical tests for bubbles do not successfully 
establish the case that bubbles exist in asset prices."
This paper contends that speculative bubbles do occur, 
based upon historical experience, and that these bubbles are 
precipitated by a large increase in the supply of money. This 
monetary intervention creates situations that manifest 
themselves in ma1investment, i.e., speculative bubbles. What 
then follows is the required period of readjustment, i.e., 
crash and depression. This sequence of events is similar to 
the Minsky/Kindleberger sequence of events that characterize 
stock market booms and busts, as outlined by Antoin Murphy 
(1986, 66-67).
(1) The market rise starts off because of
some exogenous shock such as war, the end
of a war, a technological or natural 
resource discovery, or 'a debt conversion 
that precipitously lowers interest 
rates'. The shock creates new
opportunities for profit and a boom is 
engendered.
(2) The boom is nurtured by an expansion of 
bank credit which expands the money 
supply. Alternatively the velocity of 
circulation increases.
(3) As increased demand pushes up the prices 
of goods and financial assets, new profit 
opportunities are found and confidence
grows in the economy. Multiplier and
accelerator effects interact and the 
economy enters into a 'boom or euphoric 
state.' At this point overtrading may 
take place.
(4) Overtrading may involve:
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(a) Pure speculation, that is over­
emphasis on the acquisition of 
assets for capital gain rather 
than income return
(b) Overestimation of prospective 
returns by companies
(c) Excessive gearing involving the 
imposition of low cash 
requirements on the acquisition 
of financial assets through 
buying on margin, by instalment 
purchases, and so on.
(5) When the neophytes, attracted by the 
prospect of large capital gains for a 
small outlay, become numerous in the 
market, the activity assumes a separate 
abnormal momentum of its own. Insiders 
recognize the danger signals and move out 
of securities into money.
(6) A financial distress period sets in as 
the neophytes become aware that if there 
is a rush for liquidity prices will 
collapse. The race to move out of 
securities gathers pace.
(7) Revulsion against securities develops as 
banks start calling in loans and selling 
collateral.
(8) Panic sets in as the market collapses and 
the question arises as to whether the 
government or Central Bank should come in 
and act as a lender of last resort in 
what has been recently described as a 
'lifeboat operation.' [Murphy's emphysis]
Help in accounting for how speculative bubbles are 
initiated comes to us from the Austrian School. The Austrian 
trade cycle theory serves to shed a bright light on how boom- 
bust business cycles are created, with speculative bubbles 
many times being an offshoot from these business cycle booms.
The Austrian view of the trade cycle begins with the view 
that, in a market economy, entrepreneurs serve as forecasters,
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predicting what consumers will want in the future. After 
determining future wants, they set about the task of 
organizing and implementing the factors of production, in the 
present, so that the product will be available when the 
consumers demand it, at a price sufficient for the 
entrepreneur to reap a profit.
What happens in a bust and the subsequent depression is 
that a preponderance of entrepreneurs have predicted in error 
and go bankrupt. Why is there this cluster of entrepreneurial 
errors? The answer lies not in examining the bust, but the 
boom that leads up to the crisis.
The boom-bust cycle begins with a monetary intervention 
into the economy. In the modern world this occurs by way of 
the banking system's excessive issue of credit. This increase 
in what Mises called "fiduciary media," or unbacked banknotes 
or deposits, serves to reduce interest rates, and sends the 
false signal to entrepreneurs, that consumers have changed 
their consumption/investment mix to one of greater investment 
and less consumption. Businessmen then invest this increased 
amount of money in capital goods, shifting resources away from 
consumer goods.
Prices and wages , are then bid up in capital goods 
industries, but as this new money trickles down to consumers, 
their "time preferences," or consumption/investment mixes, 
have not actually changed, thus there is no increase in demand 
for the now abundant capital goods. The increased supply of
unwanted capital goods, or ma1investment, must then be 
liquidated. This liquidation is then followed by a recession 
or depression, which is the economy's healing period, serving 
to reallocate the factors of production to more productive and 
efficient ways of satisfying customer wants (Rothbard 1983a, 
15-25).
What also must be considered, when searching for what
creates an environment from which speculative bubbles can
emerge, is that age old question: What is the right amount of
money for any given economy? Is more money beneficial for an
economy? Does more money, constitute more wealth? If more
money is beneficial, then would not all the new money be
channeled into production investment? David Hume (1970, 33)
explains what money is, and is not:
Money is not, properly speaking, one of the
subjects of commerce; but only the instrument which 
men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of 
one commodity for another. It is none of the
wheels of trade: It is the oil which renders the
motion of the wheels more smooth and easy.
Money is useful only for its exchange-value, thus an
increase in the supply of money, as Rothbard (1985, 13)
indicates, "does not-unlike other goods-confer a social
benefit." [Rothbard's emphasis] Thus, if there is more money
produced in an economy, its price will drop, making all other
goods, which money is traded for, more expensive, in money
terms.
The supply of money in the free market is determined by 
the market. So if gold is the money in a particular economy,
the market will decide the amount of gold that will be 
produced for use as money. All of the gold that is mined will 
not be demanded by the market for use as money. Some of the 
precious metal would be channeled toward jewelry or industrial 
uses. But if by government mandate all gold is coined, even 
though the market does not demand it, the effect of this over­
supply of money will lead to the same malinvestments as an 
increase in fiduciary media.
Three different speculative bubbles will be explored in 
this paper. The first is Tulipmania, which occurred in 1634- 
37 in Amsterdam. The Tulipmania episode was spurred by the 
enormous influx of silver specie, and to a lesser extent gold, 
into Amsterdam, as a result of free coinage laws, the 
stability of the Bank of Amsterdam, increased trade, and the 
Dutch Navy's success on the high seas at confiscating 
treasure.
Next, will be a discussion about the life and theories of 
perhaps the world's first inflationist, John Law and the 
bubble that he engineered directly, The Mississippi Bubble. 
Law viewed paper money, and in fact stocks, bonds or any other 
financial instruments as superior to gold or silver money. 
Law, like so many after him, also felt that low interest rates 
and more money were essential for a healthy thriving economy. 
Law was to fuel the speculation in Mississippi Company shares 
with enormous amounts of banknotes before the house of paper 
finally collapsed. The South Sea Bubble, which occurred
almost simultaneously with the Mississippi Bubble, was an 
attempt to mirror Law's system, refinancing government debt 
with the shares of the South Sea Company. This company, whose 
share price was to rise ten-fold, had no real assets and could 
only make a profit from a large increase in the price of its 
stock. The share price increase was aided with increased bank 
loans, and other credit.
In the final chapter these three episodes shall be viewed 
in the context of the Austrian theory of malinvestment. What 
will also be considered are the prospects for the continued 
occurrence of speculative bubbles and the inevitable crashes 
that follow, given fiat banking and the presence of ubiquitous 
central banks waiting to prolong any boom and prop up any 
inevitable bust.
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CHAPTER TWO 
TULIPMANIA
"Tulipmania" has come to be virtually a metaphor in the 
economics field. When one looks up Tulipmania in The New 
Palgrave (1987), a discussion of the 17th century Dutch 
speculative mania will not be found. The author, Guillermo 
Calvo (1987, 707), instead defines tulipmania as: "situations 
in which some prices behave in a way that appears not to be 
fully explainable by economic 'fundamentals'." Calvo (1987, 
7 07) , then goes on to use mathematical models to discuss 
"...equilibria that may resemble tulipmanias, but which are 
consistent with standard demand-supply analysis under the 
assumption of Perfect Foresight or Rational Expectations."
Brown University economist, Peter Garber, has written 
extensively about Tulipmania. Garber's article, "Tulipmania", 
found in the Journal of Political Economy (1989), sought to 
explore the fundamentals of the Amsterdam tulip market in 
1634-37. After a cursory review of the historical accounts of 
Tulipmania, centering for the most part on the seven pages 
Charles Mackay devoted to the subject in Memoirs of 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 
Garber initiates a discussion of the tulip and tulip markets
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of 1634 Holland. He begins by dispensing information on the 
nature of the tulip.
The tulip, being a bulb flower, can reproduce, either by 
seed, or through buds formed on female bulbs. The buds can 
reproduce another bulb if properly cultivated, the most 
effective method of reproduction being that of asexual 
reproduction through buds. The flowers of the tulip appear in 
April and May, and are only in bloom for about a week. The 
bulbs can be removed from the ground in June, but must be 
replanted again by September.
The extraordinary patterns some tulips display is caused 
by a mosaic virus. These patterns cannot be duplicated by 
seed reproduction; it is only by cultivating the effected buds 
into new bulbs that duplication can occur. The seeds produce 
only common flowers that later succumb to the virus creating 
new patterns. The downside to the virus is that it subdues 
the rate of reproduction. Thus, those tulips with more exotic 
patterns, were slower to reproduce, making them more scarce 
and valuable than common uninfected bulbs (Garber, 1989, 541- 
42) .
Garber's discussion of the bulb market begins with the 
assertion that this market was limited to professional growers 
until late 1634, when speculators entered the market, driven 
by high demand for bulbs in France. Rare bulbs were traded as 
"piece" goods by weight, with the weight standard being aas, 
about one-twentieth of a gram. Common bulbs traded in
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standard units of 1,000 azen or one pound (9,728 azen in 
Haarlem, 10,240 azen in Amsterdam), with contracts not 
referring to specific bulbs.
Given the growing season mentioned above, the tulip 
market was a futures market from September to June. Garber 
(1989, 541-42) indicates that formal futures markets began in 
163 6, and were the primary vehicle for trading in bulbs until 
February 1637, when the market collapsed. In the summer of 
1636, trading of futures took place in taverns, in groups 
called "colleges", with few rules restricting bidding and 
fees. Buyers were required to put up a small fraction of the 
contracted amount of each deal for "wine money." Otherwise, 
Garber indicates, there was no margin required by either buyer 
or seller. On settlement date, buyers did not typically have 
the required cash to settle the trade, but the sellers did not 
have the bulbs to deliver either. Thus, the trade was settled 
with only a payment of the difference between the contract and 
settlement price being expected. Contracts were not 
repeatedly marked to the market; thus when the market 
collapsed, gross positions, rather than net, had to be 
unwound.
With the market collapse in February, 1637, no bulbs were 
delivered under the deals consummated by the new futures 
market. Bulbs could not be delivered until June. Garber says 
that it's unclear as to the settlement date and price for 
these transactions. It would appear that some sort of
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standard price was developed, based upon the price that the 
majority of trades settled at.
Rare bulbs began to trade at increasingly higher prices 
in 1635. However, it was November 1936 before the speculation 
in the common bulbs began. N.W. Posthumus (quoted in Garber 
1989, 541-42) said the following concerning the timing of
events:
I think the sequence of events may be seen as 
follows. At the end of 1634, the new non­
professional buyers came into action. Towards the 
middle of 1635 prices rose rapidly, while people 
could buy on credit, generally delivering at once 
some article of value; at the same time the sale 
per aas was introduced. About the middle of 163 6 
the colleges appeared; and soon thereafter the 
trade in non-available bulbs was started, while in 
November of the same year the trade was extended to 
the common varieties, and bulbs were sold by the 
thousand azen and per pound.
In the next section of Garber's "Tulipmania", he graphs 
price data for various types of bulbs, placing time on the 
horizontal axis (typically June 1636 through February 1637) 
and price (guilders or Aas) on the vertical axis. All the 
graphs reflect sharply ascending slopes, at various degrees; 
six out of eight graphs reflect prices exploding upward to 
February 5, 1637 and plunging downward that same day. The 
graph for the Gouda bulb indicates its price peaked on January 
29 and crashed on February 5 as with the other bulbs. The 
other graph, for the Semper Augustus bulb, reflects price 
information on a yearly scale and shows the peak price 
occuring in 1637 (Garber 1989, 543-45).
After the market crashed in the first week of February,
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a delegation of florists in Amsterdam on February 24th made 
the proposal that tulip sales contracts consummated before 
November 30, 163 6 should be executed, but that transactions 
occuring after that date could be rescinded by the buyer upon 
payment of ten percent of the sales price to the seller. 
However, the Dutch authorities came up with their own plan on 
April 27th: to suspend all contracts. Thus, sellers could 
then sell contracted bulbs at the market prices during this 
suspension. Buyers were then responsible for the difference 
between this market price and the settlement price decided by 
the authorities. By doing this, growers were released to 
market bulbs to be exhumed that June. Garber (1989, 546-49) 
goes on to explain that the disposition of further contracts 
is not clear, but the example of the city of Haarlem solution 
is cited from Posthumus, which permitted buyers to cancel 
contracts upon payment of three and one-half percent of the 
contract price.
After a discussion of eighteenth-century tulip and 
hyacinth prices, along with modern bulb prices, Garber (1989, 
547-50) looks to answer the question: "Was This Episode a
'Tulipmania'?" He responds to the issue that many works 
written about the economic history of 17th century Holland 
make just the slightest reference or no reference at all to 
Tulipmania, by making the accurate point that, given the short 
duration of the mania, it had little effect on Holland's 
allocation of resources. Remember that bulbs must be
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planted by September and cannot be removed until June. Thus,
at the apex of the bubble, November 163 6 through January 1637,
it was too late to plant more bulbs. Garber (1989, 555-56)
also contends that, in spite of the crash in tulip bulb
prices, little wealth was transferred given that only small
settlements were required on contracts. This author questions
this view that there was no financial pain felt from the
crash. Other sources, that will be explored later in this
paper, indicate that bankruptcies doubled in Amsterdam in
1637-38, a period immediately following the crash.
Garber (1989, 558) comes to the conclusion that, "the
bulb speculation was not obvious madness, at least for most of
the 1634-37 'mania'. Only the last month of the speculation
for common bulbs remains a potential bubble..." Indeed, the
price of the common bulb, the Witte Croonen, rose by
approximately 26 times in January 1637, and subsequently fell
to one-twentieth of its peak price the first week in February,
1637 (Garber 1989, 556).
Economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger has written
extensively on manias and bubbles. His book, Manias, Panics,
and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises [1978] (1989), is
considered among the definitive books on the subject. But
Tulipmania, despite being a modern day metaphor for mania, is
given but scant mention in a footnote on page seven of the
second (1989) edition, as follows:
Manias such as the Lubeck crises 100 years earlier, 
or the tulip mania of 1634 are too isolated and
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lack the characteristic monetary features that come 
with the spread of banking after the opening of the 
eighteenth century. Peter Garber has dealt at 
length with the tulip mania. He distinguishes a 
"bubble" from ordinary economic fluctuations: the 
latter are determined by "fundamentals," while the 
former deviates from the set of prices that 
fundamentals would call for. In the tulip mania, 
which he suggests was not a bubble, the fundamental 
accounting for the enormous rise of some tulip 
prices was the difficulty of producing them.
In A Financial History of Western Europe (1984),
Kindleberger refers to tulip mania as "probably the high
watermark in bubbles," yet only devotes five lines to the
subject in the entire book (1984, 215, 272) . Judging by his
treatment of the subject, it would appear that Kindleberger,
one of today's most noted main-stream economic historians,
places little historical importance on the events in Amsterdam
in 1634-37. The reason for Kindleberger's slight is found in
the footnote referenced above, in particular: "... lack the
characteristic monetary features that come with the spread of
banking in the eighteenth century." Kindleberger devotes
chapter four of Manias, Panics, and Crashes to monetary
expansion. He begins this chapter with the following:
"Speculative manias gather speed through expansion of money
and credit or perhaps, in some cases, get started because of
an initial expansion ofvmoney and credit. One can look back
at particular manias followed by crashes or panics and see
what went wrong" (1978, 57). He then goes on to spend a
couple of pages referencing various bubbles and ensuing
crashes, all of which were created by monetary expansion.
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However, Tulipmania is not mentioned, for the obvious reason 
that Kindleberger does not believe that an expansion of the 
supply of money in Amsterdam created Tulipmania. Later in the 
same chapter the Bank of Amsterdam is talked about. The bank, 
at the time of Tulipmania, did not perform credit operations 
but only issued notes against deposits of specie. Thus, it's 
highly probable that in Kindleberger's view the supply of 
money did not undergo the sudden increase needed to create a 
speculative bubble. But in fact the supply of money in 
Amsterdam had increased dramatically, and that is where this 
author's story of Tulipmania begins.
19
CHAPTER THREE
FREE COINAGE. THE BANK OF AMSTERDAM.
AND TULIPMANIA
After the fall of the Roman Empire, many different money 
systems prevailed throughout Europe. Kings were eager to 
strike their own gold and silver coins. These coins were 
typically made full legal tender, at a ratio of value fixed by 
the individual states. This supreme right of coinage was 
exercised and misused by every sovereign in Europe. After 
the fall of Byzantium, the sacred images which were struck on 
most coins disappeared. These sacred images had kept the 
superstitious masses, not to mention states, from altering the 
coins. But, without these sacred images, these gold and silver 
coins underwent numerous alterations, to the point where it 
was difficult to follow either a coin's composition or value. 
This "sweating," "clipping," or "crying" of coins continued 
right up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, with all 
of Europe's various rulers being guilty. These kings quickly 
found that an empty state treasury could be filled by debasing 
the currency.
The powerful Charles V was among the most culpable for 
alterating the value of money. These alterations in the 
Netherlands came by monetary decree. In 1524, Charles raised
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the value of his gold coins from nine or ten, to eleven and 
three-eighths times their weight in silver coins. This 
created immense displeasure throughout the kingdom, so much 
that, in 1542, Charles returned to a ratio of ten to one, not 
by lowering the value of his gold coins back to their value 
before 1524, but by degrading his silver coins. Four years 
later, in 1546, Charles struck again, suddenly raising the 
value of his gold coins to thirteen times the value of silver 
coins. These actions served to first overvalue and then 
undervalue gold in relation to its market value to silver1, 
with the result being that the overvalued money drove the 
undervalued money out of circulation. This phenomenon is 
known as Gresham's Law. A silver ducat went from 54 grains 
fine down to 35 grains fine (Del Mar [1895] 1969, 345) . 
Thus, with silver coins being the primary circulating medium 
of Holland, this action reduced the value of the circulating 
money supply by one-third from its value in 1523, and raised 
the value of gold nearly fifty per cent. By this devise, 
Charles was able to replenish his dwindling treasury.
This transgression, in 1546, writes Del Mar ([1895] 1969, 
348) may have been "the straw that broke the patience of his 
long-suffering subjects.," A revolution was then sparked in 
the Netherlands and although Charles was able to check any 
upheaval during his reign, with the accession of Phillip the 
Bigot, the smoldering revolutionary fires burst into intense 
flames. After the "Confederation of Beggars" formed in 1566,
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six years later the revolution was proclaimed.
One of the first measures instigated by the revolutionary
government was "Free" or "individual" coinage. Helfferich
([1927] 1969, 370) explains:
The simplest and best-known special case of 
unrestricted transformation of a metal into money 
is that known as "the right of free coinage," or 
"coinage for private account." The State will mint 
coins out of any quantity of metal delivered to it, 
either making no charge to the person delivering 
the metal, or merely a very small charge to cover 
cost. The person delivering the metal receives in 
coin from the mint the quantity of the metal 
delivered up by him either without any deduction or 
with a very small deduction for seigniorage.
The idea of free coinage was brought to the Netherlands
from the Dutch East Indians, who inherited the concept from
the Portuguese. The practice was originated by the degenerate
Moslem governments of India, and was copied by Mascarenhas in
1555 (Del Mar [1895] 1969, 344-51).
Free coinage was an immediate success. Possessors of
silver and gold bullion obtained in America, "had vainly
sought to evade the coinage exactions of the European princes;
now the door of escape was open; they had only to be sent to
Holland, turned into guilders and ducats, and credited as
silver metal under the name of sols banco" (Del Mar [1895]
1969, 351).
As the seventeenth century began, the Dutch were the 
driving force behind European commerce. With Amsterdam as 
capital of Holland, it served as the central point of trade. 
Amsterdam's currency consisted primarily of the coins of the
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neighboring countries and to a lesser extent its own coins. 
Many of these foreign coins were worn and damaged, thus 
reducing the value of Amsterdam's currency about nine per cent 
below that of "the standard" or the legal tender. Thus, it 
was impossible to infuse any new coins into circulation. Upon 
the circulation of newly minted coins, these newly minted 
coins were collected, melted down, and exported as bullion. 
Their place in circulation was quickly taken by newly imported 
"clipped" or "sweated" coins. Thus, undervalued money was 
driven out by overvalued or degraded money, due to the legal 
tender status given these degraded coins (Smith [1776] 1965, 
447) .
To remedy this situation, the Bank of Amsterdam was 
originated in 1609. The Bank was to facilitate trade, 
suppress usury, and have a monopoly on all trading of specie. 
But the bank's chief function was the withdrawal of abused and 
counterfeit coin from circulation (Bloom [1937] 1969, 172-73). 
Coins were taken in as deposits, with credits, known as bank 
money issued against these deposits, based not on the face 
value of the coins, but on the metal weight or intrinsic value 
of the coins. Thus, a perfectly uniform currency was created. 
This feature of the new money, along with its convenience, 
security and the City of Amsterdam's guarantee2, caused the 
bank money to trade at an agio, or premium over coins. The 
premium varied (four to six and one-quarter per cent), but 
generally represented the depreciation rate of coin below its
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nominal or face value (Hildreth [1837] 1968, 9).
One of the services that the Bank provided was to 
transfer, upon order from a depositor, sums (deposits) to the 
account of creditors, by book entry. This is called a giro 
banking operation. This service was so popular that the 
withdrawal of deposits from the bank became a very rare 
occurrence. If a depositor wanted to regain his specie, he 
could easily find a buyer for his bank money, at a premium, 
due to its convenience. Additionally, there was a demand for 
bank money from people not having an account with the Bank 
(Clough 1968, 199). As Adam Smith ([1776] 1965, 447-48) 
related in the Wealth of Nations: "By demanding payment of the 
bank, the owner of a bank credit would lose this premium." 
The City of Amsterdam's guarantee, in addition to the 
requirement that all bills drawn upon or negotiated in 
Amsterdam, in the amount of six hundred guilders or more, must 
be paid in bank money, "took away all uncertainty in the value 
of the bills," and thus forced all merchants to keep an 
account at the bank, "which necessarily occasioned a certain 
demand for bank money."
Smith ([1776] 1965, 448-49) goes on to explain the
mechanics of how the Bank of Amsterdam issued bank money. The 
Bank would give credit (bank money) in its books for gold and 
silver bullion deposited, at roughly five per cent below the 
bullion's then current mint value. At the same time as this 
bank credit was issued, the depositor would receive a receipt
that entitled the depositor, or bearer, to draw the amount of
bullion deposited from the bank, within six months of the
deposit. Thus to retrieve a bullion deposit, a person had to
present to the bank: 1) a receipt for the bullion, 2) an
amount of bank money equal to the book entry, and 3) payment
of a quarter of one per cent fee for silver deposits, or one
half of one per cent fee for gold deposits. Should the six
month term expire with no redemption, or without payment of a
fee to extend for an additional six months, "the deposit
should belong to the bank at the price at which it had been
received, or which credit had been given in the transfer
books." Thus the bank would make the five per cent fee for
warehousing the deposit, if not redeemed within the six month
time frame. The higher fee charged for gold was due to the
fact that gold was thought to be risker to warehouse, because
of its higher value. A receipt for bullion was rarely allowed
to expire. When it did happen, more often than not, it was a
gold deposit because of its higher deposit fee.
This system created two seperate instruments, that were
combined to create an obligation of the Bank of Amsterdam. As
Smith ([1776] 1965, 450) explains:
The person who by > making a deposit of bullion 
obtains both a bank credit and a receipt, pays his 
bills of exchange as they become due with his bank 
credit; and either sells or keeps his receipt 
according as he judges that the price of bullion is 
likely to rise or to fall. The receipt and the 
bank credit seldom keep long together, and there is 
no occasion that they should. The person who has a 
receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds 
always plenty of bank credits, or bank money to buy
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at ordinary price; and the person who has bank 
money, and wants to take out bullion, finds 
receipts always in equal abundance.
The holder of a receipt cannot draw out the bullion 
for which it is granted, without re-assigning to 
the bank a sum of bank money equal to the price at 
which the bullion had been received. If he has no 
bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those 
who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw 
out bullion without producing to the bank receipts 
for the quantity which he wants. If he has none of 
his own, he must buy them of those who have them.
The holder of a receipt, when he purchases bank 
money, purchases the power of taking out a quantity 
of bullion, of which the mint price is five per 
cent, above the bank price. The agio of five per 
cent, therefore, which he commonly pays for it, is 
paid, not for an imaginary, but for the real value.
The owner of bank money, when he purchases a 
receipt, purchases the power of taking out a 
quantity of bullion of which the market price is 
commonly from two to three per cent, above the mint 
price. The price which he pays for it, therefore, 
is paid likewise for a real value. The price of 
the receipt, and the price of the bank money, 
compound or make up between them the full value or 
price of the bullion.
The same system that Smith describes above, also applied
to coins that were deposited with the bank. Smith ([1776]
1965, 451) does assert that deposits of coinage were more
likely to "fall to the bank" than deposits of bullion. Due to
the high agio (Smith indicates typically five per cent) of
bank money over common coin, the paying of the bank's six-
month storage fee created a loss for holders of receipts.
The amount of bank money for the which the receipts had
expired, in relation to the total amount of bank money was
very small. Smith ([1776] 1965, 451) writes:
The bank of Amsterdam has for these many years past 
been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for 
which the receipts are very seldom allowed to
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expire or, as they express it, to fall to the 
bank. The far greater part of the bank money, or 
of the credits upon the books of the bank, is 
supposed to have been created, for these many years 
past, by such deposits which the dealers in bullion 
are continually both making and withdrawing.
The bank was highly profitable for the city of Amsterdam.
Besides the aforementioned warehouse rent and sale of bank
money for the agio, each new depositor paid a fee of ten
guilders to open an account. Any subsequent account opened by
that depositor would be subject to a fee of three guilders.
Transfers were subject to a fee of two guilders, except when
the transfer was for less than six hundred guilders. Then the
fee was six guilders (to discourage small transfers).
Depositors were required to balance their accounts twice a
year. If the depositor failed to do this, he incured a
twenty-five guilder penalty. A fee of three per cent was
charged if a depositor ordered a transfer for more than the
amount of his account (Smith [1776] 1965, 454).
In the beginning, the Bank of Amsterdam did not perform
a credit function; it was strictly a deposit bank, with all
bank money backed one hundred percent by specie. The
administration of the Bank of Amsterdam was the charge of a
small committee of city government officials. This committee
kept the affairs of the bank secret. Because of the secretive
nature of its administration, it was not generally known that
individual depositors had been allowed to overdraw their
accounts as early as 1657. In later years, the Bank also
began to make large loans to the Dutch East India Company and
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the Municipality of Amsterdam. By 1790 word of these loans 
became public and the premium on bank money (usually four 
percent, but sometimes as high as six and one-quarter percent) 
disappeared and fell to a two percent discount. By the end of 
that year the Bank virtually admitted insolvency by issuing a 
notice that silver would be sold to holders of bank money at 
a ten percent discount. The City of Amsterdam took the Bank 
over in 1791, and eventually closed it for good in December of 
1819 (Conant [1927] 1969, 289).
The effects of free coinage combined with the stability 
of the Bank of Amsterdam, created the impetus that channeled 
the large amounts of precious metals being discovered in 
America, and to a lesser degree in Japan, towards the 
direction of Amsterdam.
After Columbus came to America in 1492 and Cortes invaded 
Mexico in 1519, an influx of precious metals began to enter 
Europe, principally through Spain. The output of these 
fertile mines in the Americas reversed a trend of lower prices 
in Europe that had been caused by the combination of static 
metals production in Europe and rapidly expanding industry and 
commerce. Production in the New World was further increased 
after the discovery of Peru's Huancavelica mercury mine in 
1572. The amalgamation process which was invented in the mid­
sixteenth century depended heavily on mercury. This process 
greatly increased the efficiency of the silver production 
process (Hamilton 1929, 436-43).
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The Japanese silver mining industry was also expanding at
the same time, but without the benefit of the mercury-amalgam
process. The Dutch East India Company had a virtual monopoly
on trade with Japan and of course access to their precious
metals production from 1611 through the end of the century.
Del Mar ([1902] 1969, 307-8) points out that, "from 1624 to
1853 the Dutch were the only Europeans permitted to trade with
Japan...," managing "to obtain about one-half of the total
exports of the precious metals from Japan."
Flynn (1983, 162, 164) indicates that:
"American output of bullion, in conjunction with
the output of Central European and Japanese mines, 
increased the world's supply of silver sufficiently 
to slowly drive its market value downward. That 
is, there was price inflation in the sixteenth
century. American and non-American mines produced 
such an enormous quantity of silver that its market 
value dropped to a level below the cost of
producing it in a growing number of European 
mines."
Francis Walker ([1881] 1968, 135) validates this view: "..the
astonishing production of silver at Potosi began to be felt.
From 1570 to 164 0 silver sank rapidly. Corn rose from about
two oz. of silver the quarter, to six or eight oz." Walker
([1881] 1968, 135) goes on to quote David Hume:
By the most exact computations that have been formed 
all over Europe, after making allowance for the altera­
tions in the numerary value, or the denomination, it is
found that the prices of all things have risen three,
four, times since the discovery of the West Indies.
The following table illustrates this large influx of
precious metals:
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Spanish Imports of Fine Gold and Silver from America (in grams)
PERIOD SILVER GOLD
1503-1510 4,965,180
1511-1520 9,153,220
1521-1530 148,739 4,889,050
1531-1540 86,193,876 14,466,360
1541-1550 177,573,164 24,957,130
1551-1560 303,121,174 42,620,080
1561-1570 942,858,792 11,530,940
1571-1580 1,118,591,954 9,429,140
1581-1590 2,103,027,689 12,101,650
1591-1600 2,707,626,528 19,541,420
1601-1610 2,213,631,245 11,764,090
1611-1620 2,192,255,993 8,855,940
1621-1630 2,145,339,043 3,889,760
1631-1640 1,396,759,594 1,240,400
1641-1650 1,056,430,966 1,549,390
1651-1660 443,256,546 469,430
TOTAL 16,886,815,303 181,333,180
Source: Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price
Revolution in Spain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1934) (reprinted in Clough 1968, 150)
Bullion flowed from Spain to Amsterdam due to both trade 
and seizure of treasure. As Violet Barbour (1963, 49-50)
relates:
In 1628 occurred the famous capture of the Spanish 
treasure fleet by Piet Heyn, which netted 177,537 
lbs. weight of silver, besides jewels and valuable 
commodities, the total estimated to come to 11 1/2 
to 15 million florins. More important than such 
occasional windfalls was the share of Dutch 
merchants in the new silver brought twice a year to 
Cadiz from the mines of Mexico and Peru, a share 
which represented in part the profits of trade with 
Spain and through Spain with the New World. Just 
what that share was from year to year we do not 
know. Only a few fragmentary estimates for non- 
consecutive years in the second half of the century 
have come to light. According to these the Dutch 
usually carried off from 15 to 25 per cent of the 
treasure brought by the galleons and the flota,
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their share sometimes exceeding, sometimes falling 
below the amounts claimed by France or Genoa:•..
Del Mar ([1902] 1969, 326-7) echos this view:
The honest Abbe Raynal explains the whole matter in 
a few words: whilst the Portuguese robbed the
Indians, the Dutch robbed the Portuguese. "In less 
than half a century the ships of the Dutch East 
India Company took more than three hundred
Portuguese vessels laden with the spoils of
Asia. These brought the Company immense returns."
Much of eastern gold, which found its way to 
Amsterdam was proceeds of double robbery.
Further evidence of an exceptionally large increase in
the supply of money in the Netherlands is provided by an
excerpt from a table of:
Total mint output of the South Netherlands, 1598-1789
(in guilders)
Gold Silver Copper Total
1628-9 153,010
• •
• •
2,643,732 4,109 2,800,851
1630-2 364,414 8,838,411 6, 679 9,209,503
1633-5 476,996 16,554,079 - 17,031,075
1636-8 2,917,826 20,172,257 - 23,090,083
1639-41 2,950,150 8,102,988 - 11,053,138
1642-4 2,763,979 1,215,645 47,834 4,027,458
• * • •
(Jan A. van Houtte and Leon van Buyten 1977, 100)
These figures point to the explosive increase in the 
supply of money for the time period from 1630-38, the later 
part of which, Tulipmania took place (1634-37).
The graph that follows is that of the deposits in the 
Bank of Amsterdam. An exceptional growth in deposits is 
reflected for the period from approximately 1625 to 1650.
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Upon close inspection it appears that from the year 163 3 to 
1638 deposits grew from five million florins to eight million 
florins, a sixty per cent increase!
Source: J.G. van Dillen (reprinted in Spooner 1972, 68)
As the above evidence indicates, free coinage, the Bank
of Amsterdam, and the heightened trade and commerce in Holland
served to attract coin and bullion from throughout the world.
As Del Mar ([1895] 1969, 351) writes:
Under the stimulus of "free" coinage, an immense 
quantity of the precious metals now found their way 
to Holland, and a rise of prices ensued, which 
found one form of expression in the curious mania 
of buying tulips at prices often exceeding that of 
the ground on which they were grown.
Del Mar ([1895] 1969, 352) goes on to discuss the end of
Tulipmania:
In 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia acknowledged 
the independence of the Dutch republic, the latter 
stopped the "free" coinage of silver florins and 
only permitted it for gold ducats, which in Holland
had no legal value. This legislation discouraged 
the imports of silver bullion, checked the rise of 
prices, and put an end to the tulip mania.
Del Mar concedes in a footnote that the mania had already been
discouraged on April 27th, 1637 by a resolution of the States-
General that canceled all contracts.
The crash of tulip prices left the growers of the bulbs 
to absorb the majority of the financial damage of the mania. 
With the government basically canceling all contracts, growers 
could not find new buyers or recover money owed them by buyers 
supposedly under contract. As Simon Schama (1987, 3 61-62)
describes:
In any event,the magistrates of the Dutch towns saw 
niceties of equity as less pressing than the need 
to de-intoxicate the tulip craze. Their
intervention was hastened by the urgency of 
returning the genie speculation to the bottle from 
which it had escaped, and corking it tightly to 
ensure against any recurrence. To some extent, 
they could feel satisfied that the ineluctable 
operations of Fortuna had already punished the 
foolhardy by taking them from rags to riches and 
back again in short order. But they still felt 
impelled to launch a didactic campaign in tracts, 
sermons and prints against folly, since its special 
wickedness had been in leading the common people 
astray.
In spite of the short duration of the tulip craze, and 
assertions by other authors to the contrary, there is evidence 
of financial pain that ^resulted from tulipmania. A chart 
depicting the number of annual bankruptcies in Amsterdam, 
Leiden, Haarlem and Groningen from 163 5-1800, presented by 
Messrs. van Houtte and van Buyten (1977, 102), reflects a
doubling in the number of bankruptcies in Amsterdam from 163 5
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to 1637. It would be hard to imagine that only tulip growers 
made up this increase in the number of bankruptcies. I 
suspect some of the "foolhardy masses" were among this group.
The story of Tulipmania is not only about tulips and 
their price movements, and certainly studying the 
"fundamentals of the tulip market" does not explain the 
occurrence of this speculative bubble. The price of tulips 
only served as a manifestation of the end result of a 
government policy that expanded the quantity of money and thus 
fostered an environment for speculation and malinvestment. 
This scenario has been played out over and over throughout 
history. But what made this situation unique was that the 
government policy did not expand the supply of money through 
fractional reserve banking which is the modern tool. 
Actually, it was quite the opposite that occured. As kings 
throughout Europe debased their currencies, through clipping, 
sweating, or by decree, the Dutch provided a sound currency 
policy which called for money to be backed one hundred per 
cent by specie. This policy, combined with the occasional 
seizure of bullion and coin from Spanish ships on the high 
seas, served to attract coin and bullion from throughout the 
world. The end result was a large increase in the supply of 
coin and bullion in 1630's Amsterdam. Free coinage laws 
then served to create more money from this increased supply of 
coin and bullion, than what the market demanded. This acute 
increase in the supply of money served to foster an atmosphere
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that was ripe for speculation and malinvestment, which 
manifested itself in the intense trading of tulips.
The Bank of Amsterdam, and the bank money it issued, 
served as the inspiration for John Law's early theories on 
money. The early seventeenth century episode in Holland, 
known as Tulipmania, was not only a bubble, driven by the same 
monetary features as later bubbles, but its catalyst, The Bank 
of Amsterdam, served to inspire the man who was to create two 
later (and more famous) bubbles, the Mississippi and South Sea 
Bubbles.
CHAPTER NOTES
1. The ratio of silver to gold from 1524 to 1546, based on the 
average for Europe, fluctuated bteween approxiamately 10% and 11 
(Rich and Wilson, eds. 1975, 459).
2. The city of Amsterdam was bound for the coin or bullion's 
security while at the Bank, against fire, robbery, or any other 
accident.
36
CHAPTER FOUR 
JOHN LAW. BACKGROUND
Perhaps no person in the history of economics has 
inspired such strong opinions, both pro and con, as John Law. 
Some view Law as a genius. To others he is considered a 
madman and swindler. In many ways he was all of these things.
Very rarely is an economist presented with the opportunity 
that John Law enjoyed. Typically, the closest an economist 
comes to implementing his or her ideas, is by serving in some 
advisory capacity to a ruler, president, or governing body. 
But even in this capacity the economist's recommendation 
becomes just one of many considerations that the politician or 
monarch takes under advisement when setting economic policies. 
But Law's situation was much different. Law himself said, 
after his fall, that he had exercised more power than any 
other uncrowned individual in Europe. At the height of his 
power, he controlled the Royal Bank (and thus the supply of 
money), the public debt, indirect taxes, colonial trade, the 
tobacco monopoly, and more than half of what is now the 
continental United States. Additionally, Law was the finance 
minister, the main economic advisor, and the favorite of an 
absolute prince (Hamilton 1968, 80).
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Because of his power, Law was able to manipulate all 
aspects of the French economy, and gave what is now known as 
"Keynesian economics," its first test. Ultimately, Law's 
system ended in disaster. But unfortunately, the mistakes 
made by John Law and his immitators in Britian continue to be 
made over and over again, to this day.
John Law was born in Edinburgh in 1671, the son of a 
goldsmith-banker. Law's father died when John was in his 
teens.1 Law's mother, a distant relative of the Duke of 
Argyll, saw to it that her son received an education in both 
theoretical and applied economics. Mackay indicates that 
young John worked for his father for three years, learning the 
Scottish banking trade. Law displayed a great aptitude for 
numbers, which aided in his quick grasp of the principals of 
the banking business.
After the death of his father, Law's interest in the 
banking business waned. At age seventeen, Law was a strapping 
young man who was a favorite with the ladies, in spite of his 
face being deeply scared from the small-pox. The young women 
called him, Beau Law, while the men nicknamed him, Jessamy 
John, for his foppery.
With young Law receiving an inheritance from his father's 
estate, he could afford to take off and see the world. His 
first stop was London, which provided John the opportunity to 
profit from certain gambling systems, using his considerable 
mathematics skills. Law was the envy of all the other
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gamblers, who after witnessing his success, began to follow
his bets. Law's way with the ladies continued in London, with
John having his choice of the most beautiful.
Law's life of leisure continued for nine years. But by
this time John was addicted to gambling, and he eventually
lost more than he could repay without mortgaging his family
estate. About this same time, Law's love life also created
trouble. While in London, a love affair with Elizabeth
Villiers 2, led to a duel with a jealous suitor of Ms.
Villiers, named Wilson. Law proved to be good with a gun
also, killing Wilson on the spot. Normally this would not have
been considered a grave offense. However, Wilson had many
powerful friends, which, combined with the fact that Law was
a foreigner, led to Law's arrest and murder charge. After
being found guilty, he was sentenced to death. But the
sentence was subsequently lowered to just a fine, based upon
the grounds that his offence was only manslaughter. While
being detained, pending an appeal by Wilson's brother, Law
bribed a guard and escaped to the continent. A reward was
offered for Law. Mackay ([1841] 1963, 3-4) quotes the ad in
the Gazette, describing Law:
Captain John Law, a Scotchman, aged twenty-six; a 
very tall, black, lean man; well shaped, above six- 
feet high, with large pock-holes in his face; big 
nosed, and speaking broad and loud.
Mackay speculates that this description was published to 
aid Law in his escape, given its exaggerated nature.
Law traveled for three years on the European continent
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studying the monetary and banking matters of the countries he 
was in by day, and speculating at the gaming tables by night.
After returning to Edinburgh in 1700, Law began to write 
on the subjects of money and trade. His first pamphlet 
entitled, Proposals and Reasons for constituting a Council of 
Trade was not well received.
Law went back to the continent after his proposal was 
sacked. More importantly, Law was unable to obtain a pardon 
for his murder of Mr. Wilson, thus making life in Scotland 
somewhat uncomfortable. For fourteen years, Law gambled his 
way across Europe, supporting himself on gaming wins. He was 
known in gambling halls everywhere as a skilled player. His 
reputation was such that he was persona non grata, in Venice 
and Genoa. The magistrates in those two cities believed him 
to be a dangerous influence on youth. While in Paris, Law 
made an enemy of the lieutenant-general of the police, who 
eventually told Law to leave town. However, by that time, Law 
had become friends with the Duke de Vendome, the Prince de 
Conti, and more importantly the Duke of Orleans. The Duke of 
Orleans and Law shared the preference for social life, and 
they frequently ran into each other at social functions. It 
was through the Duke of Orleans that Law would eventually 
implement his monetary and financial plans (Mackay [1841] 
1963, 2-4).
Law submitted a proposal for a privately owned Bank of 
France, to Madame de Maintenon, the head mistress of Louis
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XIV, in 1702. Part of the introduction of this proposal 
included the financial instruments that Law considered part of 
the money supply: stock in the Dutch and English East India 
companies, exchequer notes, Dutch government bonds, and Bank 
of England stock. Branches of the bank would be located in 
each province, with notes payable to bearer being redeemed at 
the parent bank in Paris or at any branch. Through this bank, 
Law argued, the supply of money could be increased, which 
would lower interest rates and stimulate economic activity. 
But the proposal was not accepted, some believe, due to 
Law's protestant faith, Louis being a catholic.3
With Scotland in the throws of a depression in 1704, the 
Bank of Scotland suspended specie payments. This development 
led Law, who was back in Edinburgh at the time, to make his 
land bank proposal to the Scottish Parliament. In 1705 this 
proposal was published anonymously as: Money and Trade
Considered: With a Proposal for Supplying the Nation With 
Money. Numerous other tracts were written, during that same 
period, with each author claiming that a lack of money was the 
cause of the crisis. Law's work, however, went much further 
than the others in terms of formulating the theory behind his 
proposal. But again, his work was for naught. In spite of 
support from the Lord High Commissioner, the Earl of Islay, 
and the Duke of Argyll, only two Scottish Parliament members 
supported the plan (Hamilton 1968, 79).
In 17 06, Law again was in France submitting his "Treatise
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on Money and Commerce" to French finance minister, Michel 
Chamillart. Hamilton calls this presentation Law's best, 
although it has never been published. Law was told to leave 
France, due to his radical ideas, according to Hamilton (1968, 
79) , who argues that allegations that Law was banished because 
of his gambling prowess are untrue.
Law's next stop was Italy, where in 1711, he presented 
his bank proposal, based upon the Bank of England, to Vittorio 
Amadeo II, Duke of Savoy. Although impressed with Law's 
intelligence and knowledge, the Duke felt the plan much to 
ambitious for his small country. He urged Law to try the king 
of France again (Mackay (1841] 1963, 5-6).
France's new finance minister, Desmaretz, turned down 
Law's proposal yet again in July, 1715. Desmaretz liked the 
plan, but was uneasy about a bank being so dominated by one 
man, especially if that man was to be John Law. But later 
that same year, persistence would finally pay off. Louis XIV 
died, and with the immediate heir to the throne being only 
seven years old, Law's old friend, the Duke of Orleans, 
assumed the reins of the French government.
Louis had made a shambles of the finances of the country. 
France was deeply in debt and on the verge of bankruptcy. The 
regent tried such odious tactics as a recoinage, which 
depreciated the currency by twenty per cent, and aggressive, 
heavy handed attempts at increasing tax collections. Neither 
of these tactics worked. Rather, they served to incite the
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ire of the populace. Thus, when Law presented his plan he was 
well received. But while Law was able to garner the Duke's 
support for a royal bank, the Council of Finance rejected the 
proposal on October 24, 1715. However, this was to be Law's 
last defeat. Law altered the plan, making the bank a 
privately owned institution, and obtained a charter for the 
General Bank in early May, 1716.4 Being the first Bank of 
France, Law was able to draft the charter document, and 
subscribed to twenty-five per cent of its stock. Alas, 
Desmaretz's worst fears had come true, as the bank was 
completely dominated by Law, possibly more than any bank had 
or ever would be dominated by one man in history (Hamilton 
1968, 79).
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CHAPTER NOTES
1. Hamilton indicates that Law's father died when John was age 13, 
Mackay indicates that Law was 17.
2. Later she became the Countess of Orkney
3. Both Mackay and Hamilton make reference to this religious 
bigotry. Mackay ([1841] 1963, 5) relates, "The reason given for 
the refusal is quite consistent with the character of that bigoted 
and tyrannical monarch." He also indicates that it has appeared in 
the correspondence of the Duchess of Orleans, Madame de Baviere, 
and the mother of the Regent.
4. Hamilton indicates the 2nd of May, Mackay the 5th.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
JOHN LAW'S MONETARY THEORIES
John Law's Money and Trade Considered With A Proposal For 
Supplying The Nation With Money was published in 1705, and 
submitted to the Parliament of Scotland as a solution to lift 
that country from the depths of a depression. Law's solution, 
of course, was to create more money.
Law felt that the use of banks was the best method to 
increase the quantity of money. He was especially impressed 
with the Bank of Amsterdam, and noted its contribution to the 
prowess of the Dutch in their trade and commercial endeavors, 
in spite of having no more natural advantages than his native 
Scotland. Law ([1705] 1966, 37) noted that the Bank of 
Amsterdam was a "secure place", and describes its original 
intent:
Banks where the Money is pledg'd equal to the 
Credit given, are sure; For, tho Demands are made 
of the whole, the Bank does not fail in payment.
Law ([1705] 1966, 37) goes on say that unbacked credit was
issued despite the constitution of this bank requiring one-
hundred per cent backing.
Yet a Sum is lent by the Managers for a stock to 
the Lumbar, and 'tis thought they lend great sums 
on other occasions. So far as they lend they add 
to the money, which brings a Profit to the Country,
by imploying more People, and extending Trade; They 
add to the Money to be lent, whereby it is easier 
borrowed, and at less use, and tho none suffer by 
it, or are apprehensive of Danger, its Credit being 
good; Yet if the whole Demands were made, or 
Demands greater than the remaining Money, they 
could not all be satisfied , till the Bank had 
called in what Sums were lent.
Law ([1705] 1966, 41) goes on to propose that the 
conveniences to be gained from unreserved or unbacked money, 
were more than equal to the risks involved. Those 
conveniences being; less interest, more money, and ease of 
payments.
Within Money and Trade, Law ([1705] 1966, 51), although
advocating a system of fractional reserve banking, was not
ignorant to its harmful effects.
Raising [debasing] the Money in France is laying a 
Tax on the People, which is soon pay'd, and thought 
to be less felt than a Tax laid on any other 
way.... This Tax falls heavy on the poorer sort of 
the People.
In the last half of Money and Trade, Law espouses his
proposal for paper money backed by land. His view being that
silver was unsuitable to be money because more and more of it
was being produced. Thus it became less valuable over time.
Law believed that land would increase in value over time, for
the following reasons; because demand for it increases,
improvements are made making it more productive, it does not
lose any of its uses, and the amount stays the same. The
following capsulizes Law's ([1705] 1966, 89) proposal:
The Paper-money propos'd will be equal in value to 
Silver, for it will have a value of Land pledg'd, 
equal to the same Sum of Silver-money, that it is
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given out for. If any Losses should happen, one 
4th of the Revenue of the Commission, will in all 
appearance be more than sufficient to make them 
good.
This Paper-money will not fall in value as Silver- 
money has fallen, or may fall: Goods or Money fall
in value, if they increase in Quantity, or if the
Demand lessens. But the Commission giving out what 
Sums are demanded, and taking back what Sums are 
offer'd to be return'd; This Paper-money will keep 
its value, and there will always be as much Money 
as there is occasion, or imployment for, and no 
more.
Law lists the qualities necessary in money as being:
1. Ease of delivery
2. Same value everywhere
3. Kept without loss or expense
4. Divisible without loss
5. Capable of a stamp
6. Stable quantity
Law ([1705] 1966, 93) insists that paper money has more 
of these qualities than silver. But should Law have been 
comparing the merits of silver vs. paper or silver vs. land? 
If the paper money was to be backed by land, could one redeem 
their paper for land? If so, land itself must pass the above 
tests. If not, fiat paper must pass muster.
The following is Professor Murray Rothbard's necessary 
qualities for money:
1. Generally marketable (non-monetary value)
2. Divisible
3. High value per unit weight (portable)
4. Fairly stable supply
5. Durable
6. Recognizable
7. Homogeneous 1
The two lists are similar, however Rothbard's being 
somewhat more rigorous, it will be used for the comparison
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between silver vs. paper and silver vs. land, for use as 
money.
quality silver paper land
1. non-monetary value yes no yes
2. divisible yes yes no
3. portable yes yes no
4. stable supply yes no yes
5. durable yes no yes
6. recognizable yes no yes
7. homogeneous yes yes no
As the above reflects, silver passes the test with flying 
colors. Paper and land do not do as well. When looking at 
the paper and land columns, what stands out is that by merging 
these two columns, the three NO qualities of land could be 
changed to YESes by paper, and the four paper NOs can be 
changed to YESes by land. It's doubtful that Law went through 
this exercise, but his thought process must have been similar. 
However, the two cannot be merged. Paper backed by land, 
would have to be redeemable in land. That forces land into 
the qualities of money test, with a predictable outcome.
Although Law spends 120 pages touting land-backed money 
in Money and Trade, this author believes that Law never 
intended that paper money would be redeemable in land. He was 
only attempting to build a case for paper money that would 
eventually have little or no backing. Law began to move
toward this direction in later writings. He moved away from 
land and toward paper assets as backing for money, or to serve 
as money.
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Antoin Murphy (1991, 1113) has written that Law, between 
1707 and 1711, moved away from land bank proposals towards 
financial institutions patterned after the Bank of England and 
the East India Company. Instead of land backing financial 
claims, Law began to see the support being provided by: 
"government securities and loans to the private sector, in the 
case of the Bank of England, to fixed and working capital 
(ships, trading forts, harbours, stock in hand) and government 
securities in the case of the East India Company."
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, England was 
waging numerous wars which it financed with continous 
borrowing. This debt took the form of the government 
securities shown on the balance sheets of the Bank of England 
and the East India Company. The Bank, the East India Company, 
and later the South Sea Company, all were granted increased 
monopoly privileges in either banking or trading for their 
part in buying up government debt at lower interest rates.
Through his interest in the Bank of England and the East 
India Company, Law expanded his view of what forms money could 
take. As early as 1707, only two years after Money and Trade 
was published, Law began to view exchequer bills, bills of 
exchange, and tallies as money. In addition, new money was 
being created in the form of shares of stock in the Bank of 
England and East India Company. Murphy (1991, 1114) relates 
the following quote from Law in 'Memoire pour prouver qu'une 
nouvelle espece de monnaie peut etre meilleure que 1 'or et
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1 'argent'(1707) page 205.
What approximates most to a new type of money is 
the East India Company. The stock of this Company 
is divided into shares like that of the bank. They 
are traded each day on the exchange and the current 
price is published for the public's information in 
the gazettes. As the transfer of these shares is 
easy they are given and received in payment at the 
price at which they are traded, so that the 
merchant or trader with payments to make does not 
need to hold money as a reserve. As part of his 
capital is held in the Indies Company he can use 
these shares for payment and if difficulties in 
exchanging them at that day's market rate all he 
has to do is send them to the Exchange and convert 
them into specie, but as they are convertible they 
will not be refused.
Law believed that this "new" money would rise in value 
along with inflation, as opposed to silver specie that would 
decline in value as more was discovered or produced. Law 
felt that the exchequer bills and bills of exchange, like 
silver, were subject to this decline in value, because 
ultimately these instruments would be liquidated for specie. 
But Law was beginning to view shares of stock, the way he had 
viewed land, as being superior to silver, believing that these 
shares could never decrease in value.
In 'Memoire,' Law continued to propose a banking system 
based upon his land-bank proposal. However on a theoretical 
level he was beginning to place more emphasis on liquidity. 
Murphy writes: " He was defining as money any financial
instrument that could be used as a medium of exchange. 
Tallies, exchequer bills and bills of exchange were used for 
facilitating exchange and so came to be regarded as money by 
Law" (Murphy 1991, 1115). These ' les credits,' however,
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still lacked an attribute that Law was looking for in money; 
that of being inflation proof. Thus, in Law's mind, the 
shares fit the bill, providing the superior store of value 
function that he was looking for. The capital of the East 
India Company was employed in productive activities, not just 
money, which provided this inflation protection. Law wanted 
his monetary system to be tied to productive assets. That was 
the case with his land-bank proposal; currency being backed by 
the productivity of the land, but now he was extending this 
idea to the capital of companies.
The shares of these companies were interpreted as media 
of exchange because of their ready marketability and in Law's 
view, a view that tended to dismiss the downside risk 
associated with shares, were superior stores of value than 
money because they were linked to a productive capital base 
(Murphy 1991, 1116).
In 1711, Law was in Italy advising the Duke of Savoy and 
preparing a proposal for a bank to be established in that 
country. The proposal was heavily influenced by the structure 
of the Bank of England. Law by that time had dropped the 
land-bank plan, and was concentrating on a proposal that would 
incorporate the shares of the Bank of England and the East 
India Company into the supply of money. The Bank of England 
impressed Law for two reasons; its ability to finance the long 
and costly wars England was engaged in, and the way it had 
expanded the supply of money so that trade continued to expand
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in the face of the outflow of specie to finance the War of
Spanish Succession. Murphy (1991, 1117) quotes Law from an
unpublished manuscript in the Archivio di Stato in Turin,
(Mazzo J3 2a Categoria) page 62, which Law wrote and sent to
Amadeus, Duke of Savoy:
The stock of the Indies Company is also divided up 
in shares, like that of the Bank. They are 
negotiated and received in payment. A merchant 
with payments to make does not keep large sums in 
cash. He invests a part of his capital in the 
Indies Company or in the Bank and gives this 
shareholding in payment when he has insufficient 
cash. If there are difficulties with respect to 
acceptance he sends them to the stock exchange to 
convert them into specie, but as they are 
negotiable they are not refused at the current 
market price. Most people prefer them to specie 
because no return is derived from specie until the 
occasion arises to use it. Shares constitute a 
value already in use which is productive.
Law viewed France's problem in 1715 as twofold, a
monetary crises (too little money), similar to that of
Scotland in 1705, but also a financial crises, which stemmed
from excessive war debts. Law sought to solve this problem by
establishing a sinking fund to pay off a portion of the
government debt and establish a bank to increase the supply of
money. The bank was to be a joint venture between Law and the
King, who would receive seventy-five per cent of the profits.
Law, in turn, would receive twenty-five per cent. However,
Law's plan called for the King's profits to be consigned
to repaying France's debt. Thus, both problems would be
served; the bank to meet the shortage of money and the king's
profits to pay off the national debt. Law was linking
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monetary policy with financial policy.
Law continued to develop this linkage in the 'Memoire
sur les Banques,' which was presented to the French
authorities in July 1715. Law recommended a credit creating
bank that issued banknotes, like the Bank of England. Law
also reminded the authorities of the benefits of including
bank shares as part of the media of exchange. Bank of England
shares at that time were trading at a thirty per cent premium
over their par value. Law's proposal also included using bank
profits to purchase the Hotel de Soissons, later to be used as
the site for a stock exchange, the bank, and a center for
foreign exchange transactions (Murphy 1991, 1118-19).
Although he was repeatedly rejected by the French
authorities, Law continued to write letters to the Regent
espousing his grandiose plans. These plans began to include
more than just his bank. Murphy (1991, 1120) quotes Law in a
letter to the Regent as saying:
"But the bank is not the only nor the biggest of my 
ideas-I will produce a work which will surprise 
Europe by the changes that it will generate in 
France's favour, changes which will be greater than 
those produced by the discovery of the Indies or be 
the introduction of credit."
From all appearances this "work" Law was referring to was
the inclusion of shares in the supply of money. Law wrote,
"I will lighten the burden of the King and the 
State in lowering the rate of interest on money, 
not by legal methods, but by an abundance of 
specie.2 The specie which France mints from 
bullion taken from the Indies falls and loses its 
value in accordance with the quantities brought 
into Europe - the credit which I propose to
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introduce will have a more assured value and will gain 20 and 30 per cent on specie" (Murphy 1991,
1121).
It is clear through Murphy's findings that Law had 
formulated much of what was to be the Mississippi System, 
prior to his being granted the charter for the General Bank in 
May, 1716. The following table from Murphy (1991, 1123) helps 
to outline how Law used the framework of the Bank of England, 
the East India Company, and the South Sea Company to formulate 
the Mississippi System.
BANK OF ENGLAND 
Assets
Specie Reserves 
Gov't Securities 
Loans to Private 
Sector
Liabilities
Shares
Banknotes/deposits
EAST INDIA AND SOUTH SEA 
COMPANIES
Assets Liabilities
Fixed/Working
Capital
Gov't Securities 
Colonial Trading 
Privileges
Shares
ROYAL BANK 
[BANQUE ROYALE] 
(Earlier General Bank)
Assets
Specie Reserves 
Gov't Securities 
Loans to Private 
Sector
Liabilities
Shares
Banknotes/Deposits
COMPANY OF THE INDIES 
[COMPAGNIE DES INDES] 
(Earlier Company of the West)
Assets Liabilities
Fixed/Working 
Capital Shares
Colonial Trading 
Privileges
MISSISSIPPI COMPANY
Assets
Specie Reserves 
Fixed/Working Capital 
Gov't Securities 
Loans to Private Sector 
Colonial Trading Privileges
Liabilities
Shares
Banknotes/Deposits
This combined company served to realize three of Law's 
aims; the expansion of the supply of money, with shares
serving as money as well as banknotes and deposits, management 
of France's debt, and the development of the real economy. 
Law's "success" with his Mississippi System led, not only to 
the Mississippi Bubble, but influenced the South Sea Company 
in England, and thus aided in the creation of the South Sea 
Bubble (Murphy 1991, 1122-23).
5 5
CHAPTER NOTES
1. Rothbard, Murray. "History of Economic Thought" Lecture at the 
University of Nevada at Las Vegas. Fall 1990.
2. Law was not referring to metallic specie, but to the new type of 
'credit'.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MISSISSIPPI BUBBLE
John Law began General Bank in May of 1716; a time when 
France was economically devastated. The late 17th century and 
early 18th century had been especially cruel to the French 
people. Under the rein of Louis XIV, France had fought wars 
virtually in continuum from 1689 to 1713, first with the 
League of Augsburg and then against Great Britain, Austria, 
Holland and parts of Spain in the War of the Spanish
Succession. In addition to the loss of life and 
financial costs of these wars, the French suffered through a 
famine in 1693 and 1694, the loss of manpower and skilled
labor resulting from the persecution of the Huguenots, and the
extraordinarily cold winter of 1708-1709.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) was fought 
mainly on foreign soil which weighed heavily on the government 
treasury, as it financed armies fighting in various theaters 
throughout Europe simultaneously. This financing was provided 
by floating debt, known as billets de monnaie. These
certificates were first issued in 1701 to the owners of old 
coin and bullion who were delivering their specie for 
recoinage. But because the Paris mint was so far behind in 
striking and delivering new coins, this paper money was issued
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instead. The ever increasing war needs led to overissue, with 
the expected depreciation in their value soon taking place. 
The billets de monnaie were made legal tender in Paris to stop 
this depreciation. Additionally, a royal proclamation was 
made on December 26, 1704, calling for 7% percent interest to 
be paid on these notes. Legal tender status was extended to 
the provinces on April 12, 1707.
To finance the war, bills were issued on various royal 
agencies, adding to the billets de monnaie already in 
circulation. By 1708, the total supply of billets de monnie 
had reached 800 million livre tournois (l.t.). This large 
increase in the supply of debt, which the French government 
was obligated to pay interest on, created a tremendous burden. 
To alleviate the financial strain, the Controleur General des 
Finances, Nicolas Desmaretz, converted the 800 million l.t. in 
billets de monnaie into 250 million l.t. of billets d'etat1 
and lowered the interest rate on the new notes to 4 percent. 
However, taxes could not be paid with these new notes, as was 
the case with billets de monnaie, despite both notes being 
payable by the government. This provision served to replace 
specie with these new paper notes.
During this period, the French working class continued to 
deal in hard-money because both types of billets were issued 
in denominations too large for wage payments. More 
importantly, the common man harbored a healthy distrust for 
government issued paper money. In spite of the billets legal
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tender status, Hamilton (1969, 125) indicates that, "sellers 
accepted them for goods only at their market value in terms of 
specie, which varied from 20 to 50 percent of par." These 
fluctuations in value made both types of billets unacceptable 
as mediums of exchange, and created a basic skepticism about 
paper money in general. It was this skepticism that prevented 
the establishment of a bank of issue (Hamilton 1969, 123-26).
After the massive military buildup to wage war for the 
previous two decades, the French economy was to undergo a 
dramatic shift to peacetime operations. To resist the 
deflationary effects of this change in the economy, Desmaretz 
declared that money would be gradually devalued by 
approximately 40 percent from December 1, 1713 to September 1,
1715. The initial effect on prices was mixed, with lower 
prices in Paris, and higher prices in the cities of Marseille, 
Toulouse and Bordeaux in 1714. But by 1715, prices throughout 
France had plunged (Hamilton 1936, 51; Hamilton 1937, 444).
Louis XIV died in September of 1715 with France's 
indebtedness being 3% billion livres, or 159 livres per 
person. In spite of numerous taxes and rigorous tax 
collection, the state could not pay its debts. France was 
technically bankrupt, and was forced to restructure its debt. 
This restructure was accomplished by a combination of 
reduction, repudiation and renegotiation.
Philip, Duke of Orleans, came to power after the death of 
Louis XIV. He ruled as Regent of France from 1715 to 1723
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during the minority of Louis XV, who was the great grandson of 
Louis XIV. Philip replaced Controller General, Desmaretz, 
with the Duke of Noailles, who was given the unenviable task 
of reducing the state's debts. All of the long-term debt owed 
by the government was refinanced, with city governments, 
particularly the Hotel de Ville in Paris, acting as 
intermediaries. For a fixed return, investors would lend 
money to the municipalities, who in turn would lend the money 
to the state. Tax revenues would then be assigned to the 
municipalities to pay the interest due the bondholders.
The state was the big winner in these transactions, at the 
expense of bondholders. The state's floating rate debt was 
then subject to a Visa2, which reduced the floating debt from 
597 million livres to 198 million livres. This new debt was 
in billets d'etat, of which the government issued 250 million 
livres, 198 million livres towards the old debt, and 52 
million livres for its own account.
How the various types of old floating rate debt was 
changed into billets d'etat depended, in theory, upon the type 
of debt that was converted, whether the owner of that debt was 
the original purchaser, or whether the debt was paid for in 
cash. However, there was speculation that the size of the 
bribe to the Paris Brothers, who operated the Visa, was the 
overriding factor in how much of a particular person's debt 
was replaced with the billets.
In addition to the financial destruction imposed by the
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Visa, Noailles established the 'Chamber of Justice' in March
of 1716. Murphy (1986, 56-57) describes the Chamber of
Justice as follows:
The Chamber of Justice was an extraordinary 
commission established to judge and punish 
financiers and profiteers deemed to have made their 
wealth in a dishonest manner at the expense of the 
Crown. It was not a new phenomenon— there had been 
four Chambers of Justice in the seventeenth century 
in 1601, 1607, 1625, and 1661. They fulfilled a
dual role, providing a blood-letting... and at the 
same time holding out hope of raising badly needed 
revenue for the Crown. Under the 1716-17 Chamber 
of Justice 8,000 people were investigated with just 
over half, 4,410, taxed a total of 220 million 
livres. In some less fortunate cases people found 
guilty were sent to the galleys, imprisoned, or 
locked in stocks and pilloried. Unlike some of the 
earlier Chambers of Justice, no one was executed.
As was the case with the Visa, the Chamber of Justice was
not true to its name in doling out tax levies. It was rife
with corruption, and the wealthy financiers were treated
favorably at the expense of a less fortunate, less wealthy
class, who shouldered the brunt of the financial punishment.
This inequities created a rebellion against the Chamber, which
directly affected the collection of these taxes. Only 95
million livres were actually collected of the 220 million
levied, with the majority being paid in depreciated paper.
Noailles is said to have estimated the effective amount raised
through the Chamber as only 51 million livres.
Like all other odious tax schemes, the Chamber of Justice
combined with the Visa, stifled the French economy. The
wealthy were not inclined to spend or invest, credit
tightened, and bankruptcies increased. Recognizing the damage
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inflicted by the Chamber, Noailles had it discontinued in 
March 1717 (Murphy 1986, 54-57).
John Law obtained an exclusive charter (20 year term) for 
the General Bank in May 1716, and soon the Bank began 
operations in his home. Law picked the board of directors, 
the officers, and its first employees. Hamilton (1969, 145) 
speculates that: "No other national bank in history— not
excepting the Reichsbank under Hjalmair Schacht or the Bank of 
England under Montagu Norman— has ever been so completely 
dominated by a single man." The Bank's protector was none 
other than Law's old friend, the Duke of Orleans.
In the beginning, Bank notes were to be payable in specie 
of the weight and standard of the date. The Bank was not 
subject to taxation, nor were foreigners deposits subject to 
confiscation, in the case of war. Depositors would receive 
bank notes on sight for their coin. The Bank could open 
deposit accounts, which could be withdrawn, or through which 
an amount could be transferred to an other party, similar to 
today's check writing. Bills and letters of exchange could be 
discounted by the Bank. However the bank was not to engage in 
trade, maritime insurance, or commission business. There was 
no limit placed on the number of bank notes that could be 
issued by the bank. It was left to John Law's judgement as to 
the amount of banknotes to be in circulation (Davis 1887, 298- 
99) .
On May 20, 1716 the organization of General Bank was
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revealed. The Bank's capital totaled 6 million livres,
comprised of 1,2 00 shares at 5,000 livres each. Murphy (1986,
70-71) points out however, that:
The effective capital base of the bank was much 
smaller than this due to the fact that only one 
quarter of the capital was to be subscribed in 
specie money and three-quarters in billets d'etat 
(a type of government security). The billets
d'etat were then at a discount of about 60 per cent 
so that the effective amount of capital to be 
subscribed was:
Specie 1.5 million
Billets d'etat (4.5 x 0.4) 1.8 million
3.3 million livres
tournois
Thus, at most, the effective capital base of the 
Bank would have amounted to 3.3 million livres, but 
even then capital was to be subscribed in four 
equal installments. It is believed that only one 
instalment was actually paid up so that the General 
Bank started its operations with 825,000 livres 
(£52,700).
A tremendous amount of government debt remained 
outstanding, in spite of the amount lopped off by the Visa of
1716. It's estimated that, in addition to the abundant amount 
of long-term debt outstanding in the form of annuities, some 
250 million l.t. was outstanding in the form of billets 
d'etat, along with 215 million l.t. more in other obligations 
of the state. With this tremendous amount of debt and only an 
undercapitalized bank to work with, John Law needed another 
vehicle to lower interest rates. This vehicle was the Company 
of the West, which originated in the summer of 1717.
The idea for the Company of the West came from Le Gendre 
d'Arminy, who was the brother-in-law of financier Crozat.
The idea for the Company of the West came from Le Gendre 
d'Arminy, who was the brother-in-law of financier Crozat. 
Crozat owed a large tax liability from the Visa, and wished to 
submit his ownership of the Louisiana trade lease as payment 
for this tax. Law made a grand proposal for the Company and 
was given permission to sell shares in the company in August 
of 1717. The company issued 200,000 shares at 500 l.t. each, 
or a total capitalization of 100 million l.t.. These shares 
could only be purchased with billets d'etat, which at the time 
where discounted between 68 and 72 percent. Thus, the 
effective capitalization was more like 30 million l.t. in 
total, or 150 l.t. per share. The Company of the West's 
principal asset was the exclusive trading privilege with 
Louisiana, that was granted by the French government. The 
privilege was received in exchange for the company's 
conversion of the government's debt into company stock at a 
lower interest rate (Murphy, 1986, 71-73).
Initially, General Bank was prudently operated by 
Law and his staff. The banknotes issued by the bank were 
fully backed by specie. During the Bank's first 31 months, 
the supply of money in France was increased only 3 percent by 
the Bank's notes. The Bank met every obligation on demand and 
instilled a great deal of confidence for itself with the 
French public. By this time the operations of the Bank had 
expanded outside of Paris into the provinces. Law persuaded 
the Regent to order receivers to accept and redeem Bank notes,
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and further to remit tax receipts to Paris only in notes. 
Thus, circulation of the notes became widespread at a much 
quicker rate than would have taken place without such coercion 
(Hamilton, 1969, 145). It was Law's view that the power of 
the state should be used, if necessary, to force the use of 
bank notes, and that these notes should not bear interest, but 
be payable at site. He felt that the payment of interest on 
these notes created distrust amongst the people.
On April 10, 1717, it was decreed that all taxes and
revenues of the State be paid in bank notes and received at 
par for that purpose. It is this date that is recognized as 
the first intervention of the state on behalf of General Bank, 
although as mentioned above, the provinces had received orders 
from the State six months prior to this. The provinces were 
united in their opposition to the use of the bank notes, and 
the Duke of Noailles was forced to follow up with 
supplementary decrees no less than three additional times, 
issued September 12, 1717, February 26, 1718, and June 1,
1718, before the opposition finally succumbed (Davis, 1887, 
303-5). On December 4, 1718, General Bank formally became 
the Royal Bank, although the outstanding stock of the bank 
had already been purchased by the government prior to this 
date (Hamilton, 1969, 145).
The share price of the Company of the West in May of 1719 
was still languishing, selling at a discount to their nominal 
issue price of 500 livres per share. For Law to fully set in
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motion his system, buying momentum was needed to spur an 
increase in the share price. His first move was to merge the 
Company of East Indies and the China Company together with the 
Company of the West. The new company was known as the Company 
of the Indies (aka. Mississippi Company). To accomplish this 
alliance required funds, to pay off the heavy debt of both the 
China and East Indies companies, to outfit existing ships, and 
to build new ships. The Company could then exploit the 
colonial trade that was now under its complete control. The 
Mississippi Company then took over the Company of Africa on 
June 4th, which required further funding. To generate the 
needed capital, Law proposed issuing 50,000 shares at 500 
livres per share, with a premium of 50 livres per share due 
immediately. Parliament refused to approve the issue, but the 
Regent stepped in and unilaterally granted approval by a 
decree of council on June 17th. By this time the price of the 
shares had risen to 650 livres, undoubtedly buoyed by the 
issue of 159.9 million livres in banknotes by the Royal Bank 
in five installments, the first in January 1719 for 18 
million, 20 million more in February, two infusions in April 
totaling 71.9 million, and 50 million more in June.
Activity in Mississippi Company shares began to pick up, 
with Law fueling the fire, by allowing the new issue of 50 
million shares to be purchased in 20 monthly installments of 
25 livres each. Law did not want interest in the old shares 
to wane while promoting the new shares, thus, in modern
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parlance, he created a rights issue, whereby only owners of
old shares, called meres, could purchase new shares, called
filles. For every four old shares owned, an investor could
buy one new share Murphy (1986, 77-78) explains:
These rights could be sold once they had paid the 
premium and the initial instalment (50 livres plus 
25 livres). Indeed, a decree of 27 July suggests 
that it was only necessary to pay the 50 livres 
premium and that the first payment of subscriptions 
was deferred till 1 September. In this way he 
maintained interest in the meres, thereby ensuring 
that holders such as the Regent and his followers 
made significant capital gains, but also provided a 
cheap way for others to come into the market by 
buying filles through monthly instalments, when 
existing holders of old shares decided to realize 
some of their capital gains by selling their partly 
paid filles. But, above all, Law through the issue 
of partly paid shares provided leverage for 
investors to make capital gains that were a 
multiple of their initial investment. For example, 
if shares rose to 1,000 then the holder of a partly 
paid fille, assuming he had just paid the 50 livres 
premium, could make a profit of 450 livres (1,000- 
50+(25x20) by selling his fille, a profit nine 
times his initial investment.
This new marketing ploy allied with the expanded money 
supply helped to increase investor interest in the shares of 
the Company of the Indies and the share price went over 1,000 
in the middle of July.
On July 20, 1719, the Company of the Indies was awarded 
the profits of the Mint for a nine year period. The price to 
acquire these profits was 50 million livres, payable over a 
fifteen month period. Within a week of this latest 
acquisition, the Royal Bank was allowed to increase the issue 
of banknotes by 240 million livres, and on July 25th, 
220,660,000 livres worth of notes were issued. To enhance the
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12 percent (60 livres) payable in two half yearly payments in
1720. The very next day after declaring the dividend, Law
floated a new rights issue hoping to raise the 50 million
livres needed to pay for the Mint purchase. As put succinctly
by Murphy (1986, 78):
Law had moved extremely quickly. He had increased 
the money supply and so oiled the speculative 
wheels of the stock market, he promised an 
extremely high dividend to increase the 
attractiveness of shares, and he was channelling 
more shares on to the market.
This time Law priced the shares at 1,000 livres each, 
with the company of course gaining a 500 livre premium on each 
share. To buy these new shares, called petites filles, the 
purchaser had to own 4 meres and 1 fille. The petites filles 
were to be paid in twenty monthly installments of 50 livres 
each. To create a sense of urgency, Law only gave investors 
20 days to subscribe to these rights. This stoking of the 
speculative fire was not needed, for the share price had moved 
over 1,000 livres. Murphy (1986, 78) draws upon four sources 
to construct the following table of Mississippi Company share 
prices for a three week period in late July and early August,
1719.3
25 July 1, 300 (Piossens)
29 July , 1,500 (Piossens)
1 August 2,250 (Dutot)
9 August 2, 330 (Giraudeau)
14 August 2,940 (Giraudeau)
The rise in the share price continued, reaching 5,000 
livres in September. With the public interest in buying the 
shares at a fever pitch, Law turned to refinancing more of the
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government debt, once again Law floated Mississippi Company 
shares, in an attempt to lend the King 1.2 billion livres at 
a 3 per cent interest rate. This new financing was to 
refinance France's remaining billets d'etat in addition to 
replacing all of the state's rentes, or long-term obligations.
Law made four share issues in the fall of 1719 that 
totaled 3 24,000 shares: 200,000 were issued in late
September, with 124,000 more issued a week later on October 
2nd and 4th. The share price was 5,000 livres, with payment 
for the shares to be made in ten monthly installments of 500 
livres. These new shares came to be known as cinq-cents.
These new issues were to raise 1.5 billion livres, an 
amount 14 times greater than the total of Law's first three 
stock issues combined. Law had struck while the fire was hot. 
But only a fraction of this amount was raised, because 
investors who purchased cinq-cents only put up 500 livres to 
acquire their rights, the rest to be paid in nine 
installments. In fact if investors were having trouble making 
the monthly payments, Law would adjust the payment schedule to 
call for quarterly payments. Law was a master at developing 
ways to market the shares of the Company to the general 
public. In addition to the small down payment feature, Law 
developed an option market for the shares, called primes, in 
1720. The Royal Bank made low interest loans for share 
purchases, and the shares were made bearer securities, thus 
providing anonymity of ownership. This later feature was
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important, given the people's memories of the 1716 Visa tax.
But the principal fuel that drove the market was the 
continuous increase in newly created banknotes, supplied by 
the Royal Bank. By the end of 1719, the total amount of 
banknotes had increased to one billion livres, and Law, 
through his tool, the Royal Bank, was far from finished. In 
May of 1720, banknotes were to total 2.1 billion livres 
(Murphy, 1986, 130-31).
Near the end of 1719, share prices had risen to 10,000 
livres, and more than a few investors wanted to sell their 
shares and realize their profits in specie. At this point 
the Regent stepped in with various decrees to repress the 
attempted realizations. On December 9th, the company was 
granted the monopoly for the refining and separation of 
precious metals. On December 21st, banknotes were fixed at a 
five per cent premium over silver coin. Silver could then 
only be used for payments under 10 livres, with gold to be 
used only for payments less than 3 00 livres. In addition, all 
foreign letters of exchange could only be paid in notes. "Law 
foresaw that, unless he could prevent the circulation of coin, 
it would all be quietly remitted across the border" (Davis, 
1887, 434).
On December 30, 1719, the company set the dividend for 
1720 at forty per cent on the par value of 500 livres. Given 
a market price of 10,000 livres the dividend amounted to a 2 
per cent yield, or a four per cent yield on the recently
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issued cinq-cents. The company's income could not have paid
that dividend from current income. Thus, it is not viewed as
legitimate, but yet another of Law's tools to hype the stock
price. Still, this dividend was only half the income the
holders of rentes had received from the French government,
prior to being forced to relinquish rentes for shares in the
company. In fact, many rentes holders resisted the
redemption. However, Law, upon being named Contoller-General
of France in January 1720, issued an ultimatum that rentes not
redeemed by July 1st would be arbitrarily converted into two
per cent rentes.
As the share price began to wane, Law became determined
to sustain the system by force if necessary. In late 1719,
old gold and silver coins were confiscated. On January 20,
1720, a decree was passed authorizing the search of all homes
for concealed coins. Eight days later it was decreed that
banknotes were currency throughout the kingdom. The company
was then allowed to search all buildings, with any specie
seized benefiting the informer. Davis (1887, 43 9) quotes from
Memoires Secrets sur les Regnes de Louis XIV. et de Louis XV.
They excited, encouraged, paid informers. Valets 
betrayed their masters. Citizen spied upon
citizen. This made my Lord Stair say that there 
could be no doubt of Law's Catholicity, since he 
established the Inquisition, after having already 
proved transubstantiation by changing paper to 
money.
Those who still dared to hold on to coin lived in 
constant fear, and Law did not stop there. On the fourth of
February it was announced that the wearing of any type of 
precious stone was to be prohibited after the first of March, 
the penalty being confiscation and a hefty, 10,000 livre fine. 
Two days later, the Royal Bank was allowed to issue 2 00 
million livres in banknotes, and on the 9th all legal
proceedings involving banknotes, which might arise, were to be 
brought before the Council. On the 11th, all "futures"
transactions between individuals were banned, with the company 
being reserved exclusive right to sell "futures." On
February 18th, it was decreed that goldsmiths were forbidden 
to manufacture or sell vessels of gold or silver, except for 
some articles of which the weight would be specified by the 
Regent. The next day, on February 19th, it was declared that 
no person was to have more than five hundred livres in coin in 
his possession, and nobody, except goldsmiths and jewelers, 
was to have any articles of gold or silver. It was also 
announced that all payments of 100 livres and greater were to 
be made in banknotes, and all creditors of the State were 
ordered to be paid immediately.
Royal Bank was absorbed by Company of the Indies on
February 22nd. John Law had the printing presses working full 
time to keep up with his>ambitious banknote issue. Still the 
printers and clerks could not keep up. Engraved notes were 
abandoned, and more clerks were designated to sign the notes. 
In the case of ten livre notes, so many had been created that 
many were issued without signature. These lax procedures
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created mistrust on the part of the public. To regain the 
appearance of conservatism, it was decreed that no more notes 
would be issued, except by decree at a meeting of the 
shareholders of the company (Davis, 1887, 436-41).
At the same meeting, in which it was decreed that the 
Royal Bank would be merged with the Mississippi Company, a 
number of other important measures were instituted. The King 
ceded to the Company his 100,000 shares in the company and in 
return, he was credited with a 300,000 livre deposit at Royal 
Bank and the Company also committed to pay him 5 million 
livres a month for ten years. The total compensation was 900 
million livres, or 9,000 livres per share. This was close to 
the then market price of 9,545 livres on February 22nd. The 
share price had peaked on January 8th at 10,100 livres. Thus 
Law was able to cash out the King very close to the market 
top.
At this same meeting, Law announced the closing of the
Company's office for the purchase and sale of shares. Prior
to its closure, this office had supported the share price of
the Company at a high level. Murphy (1986, 132) explains the
purpose of the office:
Ostensibly this was to bring some order to the 
market and prevent transactors being duped by some 
of the 'sharks' who frequented the rue Quincampoix 
where the shares were traded. In reality it was to 
provide official support for the share price to 
prevent it falling below a certain minimum floor 
price. This policy had monetized the Mississippi 
shares and greatly expanded the liquidity of the 
economy.
73
These measures combined to produce a precipitous decline
in the price of the company's shares. Within a week, the
price fell from 9,545 livres to 7,825 livres, a 2 6 per cent
decline. Law had anticipated that there would be a movement
out of shares and banknotes into specie, and had prepared for
this event with his decrees of early February. On February
25, Law announced an augmentation of specie, raising the
louis-d'or from 25 to 30 livres and other coins pari passu.
Murphy (1986, 137) speculates that:
This augmentation was meant to signal to the 
market that a diminution of specie was imminent,
The message to specie holders was clear-move out of 
specie and into banknotes as specie would be worth 
less in terms of the money of account once the 
diminution was announced.
Two days later Law repeated the decree that prohibited a 
person to hold more than 500 livres in coin (Davis, 1887, 
440). Thus the Bank could then refuse to convert more than 
500 livres for any one person, and have the law to point to. 
Law had thus given people two choices as to what form their 
wealth could be in, banknotes or shares.
On the fifth of March, Law announced several policies, 
the first was to reopen the office that bought and sold the 
company's shares. This office was now known as bureau de 
conversions, and was buying Mississippi Company shares at a 
guaranteed price of 9,000 livres. This measure served to 
again monetize the company's shares. Davis (1887, 444)
explains:
With a fixed price attached to them, they became at
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receivable in payment of taxes, they were not made 
a legal tender, but they were convertible at will 
at a fixed price into bank-notes which fulfilled 
those purposes. Dutot calls attention to that 
phase of this decree. He says they-the shares- 
"became proper to fulfil the uses of money."
Next another augmentation of the coin was announced.
Louis-d'or went from 3 6 livres to 48 livres, and the ecu was
raised from 6 to 8 livres. This augmentation foreshadowed an
impending diminution of specie against banknotes at the Bank.
It was also ordered that all bank loans would be called at
maturity. As Davis (1887, 44 3) indicates: "This order was
peremptory, and the inference is unavoidable that the bank had
no other business than loans on margins."
Within a week, on March 11th, a series of diminutions was
decreed. These diminutions were intended to demonetize
specie. Gold was to be demonetized by May 1, with the silver
marc to be demonetized in monthly diminutions from 80 livres
to 30 livres, by December 1720. It is clear that Law's
intent was to have only two circulating mediums in France,
banknotes and Mississippi Company shares, both of which were
under his control (Murphy, 1986, 138).
The decrees of March 5, 1720 have been viewed differently
by various writers. Davis (1887, 445-46) summarizes these
views:
According to Daire, it was the keystone of the 
system, and fully realized Law's economic thought.
It transformed the bank into a reservoir of the 
circulating medium, which the paper of the Company 
of the Indies would keep at any height, since it 
served both as feeder and outlet. Should money 
become too abundant, it would find its way to the
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bank for conversion into shares. Should the 
reverse be the case, shares would be converted into 
notes. Dutot says the decree was a mortal blow to 
the system. Law was confronted with the necessity 
of sustaining either notes or shares, but was 
unable to protect both. Shares at the time 
represented more than fourfold the value of the 
notes, and he chose the shares. In taking this 
step, Dutot thinks a mistake was made. Law was 
responsible for the notes; but Dutot does not think 
him responsible for the speculation, intimates that 
the regent must be held responsible for the decree, 
and says that it was counselled by enemies of the 
system. Forbonnais says the decree absolutely 
decided the fall of the system. He thinks the 
purpose was to sustain the promised dividend by 
absorbing into the treasury shares on which the 
dividend would then not have to be paid, and that 
Law was attached to the principle of the 
multiplication of wealth, and believed that the 
shares would assume the property of money in 
circulation. Louis Blanc denounces the decree as a 
crime, which has unjustly been imputed to Law, and 
believes it was issued in the interest of the 
Court. The decree announcing that no more shares 
would be bought and sold saved the system by 
ruining several great lords. The decree of March 5 
saved several great lords by ruining the system.
However, the decree of March 5th was not the last "shoe
to drop." That distinction could possibly be assigned to the
decree of May 21st, which Murphy (1986, 148) describes as "the
Beginning of the End." The following table from Murphy
(1986, 148) outlines the phased price reductions of shares and
banknotes set forth in the decree of May 21st.
Shares. Banknotes Reductions in
Silver 
11 March Decree
Prior to decree 9, 000 10,000...100 80
21 May 8,000 8 , 000 ... 80 65(1
1 July 7,500 7,500...75 55
1 August 7, 000 7,000...70 50
1 September 6, 500 6,500 ... 65 45
1 October 6, 000 6,000 ... 60 40
7 6
1 November 5,500 5,500...55 35
1 December 5,000 5,000...50 3 0
By this decree, Law was acknowledging that his decree of
March 5th, guaranteeing the 9,000 livre price of the shares
and at the same time stipulating that silver's value would be
diminished in phases, could not be sustained. Murphy (1986,
156) explains in a footnote that:
Law argued that as silver was to be reduced from 
80 to 3 0 it was illogical to hold that shares and 
banknotes should not be reduced also....In 
retrospective comments on the System he argued that 
he wanted to make such reductions in March but had 
been prevented from doing so by vested interest 
groupings.
This comment adds credence to Louis Blanc's view that the 
system was sacrificed for the benefit of political insiders. 
As quoted by Murphy (1986, 149), Law admitted to the public: 
"It was necessary to fix a just proportion betwixt the bank 
bills and the specie, therefore we were forced to deviate from 
the former proportion, without which, the actions and bank 
bills must unavoidably have lost their credit."4
As much as Law had hoped to drive specie out of 
circulation, by the use of both market incentives and heavy 
handed coercion, the French public could not be completely 
persuaded of Law's view that paper money was better than gold 
and silver. The decrees of March, 1720 had but slight 
success in attracting specie to the Royal Bank. By May 21st, 
with the public holding 2.1 billion livres in banknotes and 
another 600 million livres at the bank or about to printed, 
the Royal Bank's specie holdings amounted to only 21 million
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livres in silver and 28 million in gold.
For the investing public, Law's decree of the 21st, cast 
a cloud of doubt over what was supposed to be an infallible 
system. Now all of a sudden, shares were subject to 
diminution similar to specie. The public outcry forced Law's 
friend, the Regent, to demote Law and place him under house 
arrest. The once revered Law, along with his system, were now 
despised, and on May 27th, the Regent attempted to stem the 
negative tide by revoking the May 21st decree. Two days
later, he announced further, an augmentation of specie along 
with rescinding the prohibition on the holding of gold and 
silver.
In spite of the system now being in shambles, Law was 
reappointed to a lesser position within the government, 
Intendant General du Commerce, and was reaffirmed as director 
of the Royal Bank. Law attempted to keep the system afloat 
through the end of 1720, but the public did not fall for any 
more of Law's financial razzle-dazzle. The following listing 
from Murphy (1986, 151) shows the downward trend in
Mississippi Company share prices from June through November of 
1720.
High Low
June 6,350 4,517
July 5,403 4,450
August 4,724 4,367
September 5,13 3 4,167
October 5,167 3,200
November 3,967 3,300
Although share prices declined, they did so gradually,
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which is a departure from other bubbles, where asset prices
typically break sharply. Murphy (1986, 152) explains:
However, there is an explanation for the gradual 
collapse in the price of Mississippi shares, a 
phenomenon not mirrored by the collapse of the
South Sea scheme where the fall in the price of 
shares was sharper and more sudden. In France
large quantities of specie had been withdrawn from 
circulation, through Law's measures and hoarding on 
the part of the more perspicacious public. Most 
wealth holders in France faced the classic 
Keynesian two-asset choice, that is money
(banknotes) or bonds (shares of the Mississippi 
Company). The price of shares did not collapse 
because French investors were locked in to holding 
either shares or banknotes. At times the price of 
shares rose because investors felt marginally more 
confident about them than about holding banknotes.
The way to truly gauge the affects of the excessive money
creation by Law, is to look at the French exchange rate, which
sank from 2 0 pence sterling in May to 6 pence in September,
and was so low it was not quoted for the last three months of
1720. It was the livres plunge against the pound sterling
that is the manifestation of the bursting of the Mississippi
Bubble. The following outline from Murphy (1986, 152)
juxtaposes this exchange rate relationship with Mississippi
share prices in both livres and sterling for selected months
in 1720.
January March May July September
Mississippi share
prices (livres) 9,085 9,000 9,018 4,895 4,367
Exchange rate pound
sterling/livres 30.0 32.3 39.3 50.7 92.3
Mississippi share
price in sterling (1/2) £302 £279 £229 £97 £47
While the drama of this boom and subsequent bust was
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being played out, what was the effect upon the lives of the 
French working class? As is the case with all government 
created monetary schemes that expand the supply of money, 
money is not spread equally over the populace; certain groups 
gain access to the money, i.e., government, borrowers, and 
speculators, while other groups, such as, the working class, 
elderly, and savers are excluded.
Hamilton (1936, 50-54) has developed index numbers to 
represent; commodity prices, money wages, and real wages in 
Paris during John Law's system. The commodity price index is 
a composite of food, raw materials, wholesale building 
materials, and household staples. However, articles with 
l!sticky" prices, such as bread and salt, were omitted. The 
money wage index is comprised of only daily wages of skilled 
and common labor, and excludes salaries. It is Hamilton's 
intention that, "the present index numbers presumably do not 
underestimate the rise of prices and wages during the 
Mississippi Bubble."
To gain a sense of the effects imposed upon the French 
populace from the tremendous increase in the supply of money, 
we shall juxtapose these indexes at selected months in the 
Mississippi Bubble story.
May Dec. July Jan. May Sep. Dec.
1716 1718 1719 1720 1720 1720 1720
Commodity Prices 100.7 112.1 116.1 171.1 189.7 203.7 164.2
Money Wages 102.7 102.7 125.8 125.8 141.2 161.9 118.1
Real Wages 101.4 89.4 113.7 74.4 75.3 84.8 82.5
The selection of the above dates was not random, each date has
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a significance, listed below.
May 1716 - General Bank is chartered
Dec. 1718 - General Bank becomes Royal Bank
July 1719 - Royal Bank expands banknote issue by 221m
Jan. 1720 - Company share price peaks at 10,100
Mar. 1720 - Law's diminution of silver
May 1720 - Law's diminution of banknotes and shares
Sep. 172 0 - Paris price index peaks
Dec. 1720 - Law's system falls apart
The above indexes illustrates the disparity between
prices and wages. As prices continued to spiral upward,
wages, although increasing a certain sporadic intervals, never
kept pace with prices. Included in the above price index, is
building materials, which experienced the largest percentage
increase of any of the goods included in Hamilton's index for
the year 1720. As is the case with many modern increases in
the supply of money, construction activity in Paris was
growing at a frantic pace, doubling the cost of building
materials. The following year, after the bubble's collapse,
three-quarters of this gain was lost (Hamilton, 1936, 65-66).
The boom and bust was not confined to Paris. Hamilton
(1937, 441-61) has compiled wage and price indices for three
cities in southern France during the Mississippi Bubble
period; Marseille, Toulouse and Bordeaux. Hamilton (1936,
455-56) summarizes his findings:
From June to October 1720 prices advanced 36 per 
cent, at Bordeaux, 47.2 per cent, at Toulouse, and 
12.3 per cent, at Marseille....
At their highest points, in October, prices at 
Bordeaux were twice as high, and at Toulouse 2.4 
times as high, as the respective averages in 1716- 
1717. Owing to the catastrophic pestilence that
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ravaged Provence in the late spring and summer of 
1720, the peak at Marseille, reached in September, 
was 2.7 times as high as in the base period. In 
their apogee, in September, commodity prices at 
Paris stood only 2.04 times as high as in 1716-17.
Concerning wages, unfortunately an acceptable wage series
could not be found for Bordeaux, but Hamilton was able to
secure financial records for Marseille delineating wages for
seven different classes of labor, and wages for four different
grades of labor in Toulouse. Wage rates in both cities,
fluctuated moderately between the years 1711 through 1718. As
Law's system began to take shape in earnest, in 1719, wages
moved up sharply in the second quarter, but still lagged
behind prices. As the system collapsed in the fourth quarter
of 1720, real wages at Toulouse stood at 82.2, and 87.8 at
Marselle, reflecting the same phenomenon as that in Paris.
Wage increases were always a step behind commodity price
increases. In the systems aftermath, wage-earners
continued to be decimated in Toulouse, as the real wage index
sank to 76.3 in the third quarter of 1721. This did not occur
at Marseille, due to the plague's decimation of the
population, thus making labor scarce. Real wages began to rise
in 1721 and continued through 1725 (Hamilton, 1937, 459).
By all measures, John Law's money machine was to spell
disaster for the French working class, whether they lived in
Paris or in the provinces. As Hamilton (1937, 461) states,
"Law's System was a catastrophe to the labouring class."
As we recount the story of John Law's Mississippi System
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and its eventually collapse, it is clear that Law was a man
very much ahead of his time. He created a bank which in many
ways could be considered the prototype of modern central
banks. Through the vehicle of the Royal Bank, Law created
paper money out cf thin air and tried in vain to escape the
confining clutches of gold and silver specie, a struggle that
has been taken up by subsequent inflation mechanics from
Benjamin Strong and Montague Norman to Alan Greenspan. The
following quote from Law (Murphy 1986, 129) sums up his view:
An abundance of money which would lower the 
interest rate to 2% would, in reducing the 
financing costs of the debts and public offices 
etc. relieve the King. It would lighten the burden 
of the indebted noble landowners. This latter 
group would be enriched because agricultural goods 
would be sold at higher prices. It would enrich 
traders who would then be able to borrow at a lower 
interest rate and give employment to the people.5
Law's theories were virtually a blue print for Keynesian
economics, as Murphy (1986, 129) says, "Keynes can be termed
as post-Lawian!"
Salerno (1991, 15) quotes Rist's ([1940] 1966, 65)
critical summary of Law's ideas:
Law's writings . . . already contain all the ideas 
which constitute the equipment of currency cranks—  
fluctuations in the value of the precious metals as 
an obstacle to their use as a standard . . . the
ease with which they can be replaced by paper 
money, money defined simply as an instrument of 
circulation (it's function of serving as a store of 
value being ignored), and the conclusion drawn from 
this definition that any object can be used for 
such an instrument, the hoarding of money as an 
offence on the part of the citizens, the right of 
the government to take legal action against such an 
offence, and to take charge of the money reserves 
of individuals as they do of the main roads, the
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costliness of the precious metals compared with the 
cheapness of paper money . . . .
Given modern central bankers and their respective 
government's willingness, if not eagerness, to reach for the 
easy-money tonic to revive an ailing economy, it is no 
surprise that an over-indebted Britain turned to John Law's 
medicine in 1720. The manifestation of Britain's financial 
chicanery is known as the South Sea Bubble, which had its 
origins with the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, an 
institution that Law sought to emulate with his Royal Bank.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE SOUTH SEA BOBBLE
Late seventeenth century England was a time of increased 
trade, industrial expansion, and, of course, war. All of 
these elements created the need, at least in the minds of the 
British, for a public bank. England's close relations with 
Holland during this period gave the British a first hand view 
of the vast Dutch economy, and the important centerpost for 
that economy, the Bank of Amsterdam. In fact, after the 
founding of the Bank of Amsterdam in 1609, other public banks 
began to be formed: local banks at Rotterdam, Delft and
Middelburg, the Bank of Hamburg in 1619, and the Bank of 
Sweden in 1656. English merchants began to be exposed 
to public banks through out Europe, and thus various proposals 
began to surface for a public bank in England.
But it was the British government that had the greatest 
need for a public bank. William, when he came to the throne, 
hoped to gain popularity by abolishing the hearth tax.1 But, 
needing money to fight the war against France, in addition to 
the civil war in Ireland and Scotland, William imposed a 
series of other taxes: the poll tax, stamp tax, window tax, 
land tax, and taxes on pedlers, hackney coaches, births, 
bachelors, marriages and burials. As is inevitable,
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government revenue was not increased in the same 
proportion as the the increase in the tax levies. Even if the 
taxes had all been collected, the war expenses were far in 
excess of the highest revenue potential of the taxes 
(Andreades [1909] 1966, 55-56).
Parliment made provisions allowing tallies to be issued 
on future sources of government tax revenue. At first these 
orders were issued against the proceeds of specific taxes. 
But the government then began to issue against revenue in 
general. These tallies were made assignable and eventually 
the majority of this government debt was held by England's 
goldsmith-bankers.
In December of 1671, the King was in need of funding to 
finance his Navy. He called upon the bankers for help, but 
they refused. After a debate in Council, the King decided to 
prohibit certain payments out of the Exchequer. His
proclamation of January 5, 1672 has come to be known as the 
"Stop of the Exchequer." The Stop allowed the King to pay 
who he wanted to, with others being out of luck. Horsefield 
(1982, 513) quotes two items in the proclaimation that allowed 
for the King's payment discretion: "all other public services 
and support of the government" as well as "all other payments 
appointed by Warrant under the Privy Seal or Royal Sign- 
Manual." The second item enabled the King to direct payments 
even on stopped funds. Not surprisingly, payments continued 
to flow to areas of the government. The most serious losses
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were absorbed by the goldsmith-bankers. With the government 
not making payments on their tallies, bankers were in turn 
forced to stop payment. Although Charles told the bankers to 
make payment to their customers, the banks did not have the 
money to do so.
The Stop was originally to only last for one year, but 
was continued until January 1674. But by that time the damage 
had been done, as Horsefield (1982, 514) indicates: "By then 
the funds on which the orders had been drawn were all 
expended, so in practice the Stop became permanent." The 
immediate effect of the Stop was that credit quickly 
evaporated. The goldsmith's notes became worthless, and 
subsequently many goldsmith-banks folded. The long- 
reaching effect of the Stop was the postponment of joint-stock 
banking for ten to fifteen years (Horsefield 1982, 511-28).
After the Stop, the King had difficulty borrowing money. 
Thus, the British government needed a bank, and of the many 
schemes proposed, the one advanced by William Paterson had the 
most promise. Paterson is described by Giuseppi (1966, 9) as, 
"one of those men whose ideas range some years ahead of their 
time and who have a streak of the true visionary about them, 
but never quite reaches, genius." Paterson and the spokesman 
for his fiancial backers, Michael Godfrey, took their plan for 
a 'Bank of England' to Charles Montague, a Lord of the 
Treasury who subsequently, in 1694, became Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Paterson's financial backers were all men of great
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substance, influencial politically and all Protestants.
In spite of such backing, the plan was vigorously debated 
upon reaching parliament for approval. The Tories feared that 
the Bank's operation would greatly strengthen the Whig 
government, while the goldsmiths and money lenders feared 
being demolished. Also, some merchants worried that the Bank 
would pose a threat to their trade business, and there were 
even some Whig supporters who feared that the Bank of England 
would make the monarchy financially independent of the 
Parliment. Prior to the proposal reaching Parliment, there 
were concerns within the government about the scheme, most 
prominently, the note issue. Paterson and his promoters 
recognized the tremendous profit potential from note issue, by 
expanding on what goldsmiths were enjoying on a local basis. 
The government took a dim view of the bank encrouching on its 
domain - the manufacture and control of England's currency.
Paterson's first proposal was denied by Parliment because 
as Clapham (1966, 16) says: "It looks as though they thought 
the proposal was for the issue of legal tender bank notes; and 
apparently that is what it was." Paterson quickly formulated 
a second proposal, which made no mention of bills, except in 
clause 28 of the Act, which was added to the original draft in 
a seperate schedule. Clapham (1966, 17) makes the comment 
that, "the clause looks like an afterthought." This proposal 
was brought before the Cabinet by Montague, who submited that 
£1,200,000 be raised, which in turn would be lent to the
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Government at 8 per cent, under the condition that the 
subscribers be incorporated and that £4,000 a year go towards 
their management expenses.
Paterson's scheme was debated at length by the Cabinet. 
Finally, it was agreed that a bill containing the proposal 
should be put before Parliment, where it was passed after 
being adroitly attached to an ordinary finance bill. The act 
was was not known as the Bank of England act, but as:
An Act for granting to their Majesties several 
Rates and Duties upon Tunnage of Ships and Vessels, 
and upon Beer, Ale and other Liquors: for securing 
certain Recompenses and Advantages, in the said Act 
mentioned, to such persons as shall voluntarily 
advance the Sum of £1,500,000 towards carrying on 
the War against France.
Thus, the Bank in its early years was called the "Tunnage 
Bank." On April 25, 1694, the Act received the Royal Assent, 
and subscriptions for £1,200,000 of the £1,500,0002 began to 
be taken. Opponents of the Bank attempted to postpone the 
commission, but the Queen squelched the antagonists 
immediately. William, plain and simple, needed the money to 
fight France. The subscription books were opened at 'Mercer's 
Chappell' on June 21st, with £300,000 being subscribed the 
first day. The entire £1,200,000 was completed by July 2nd. 
The first subscribers were the King and Queen for £10,0003, 
followed by 1,267 individual holders. Subscribers were 
required to pay 25 per cent of their subscribed amount in cash 
(Giuseppi 1966, 11-12).
As remarkable as the speed of filling the subsciption
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was, is how quickly the subscription's full sum made its way
into the Exchequer. The Bank had promised to complete the
operation by January 1, 1695, but full funding was in fact
completed by mid-December. Clapham (1966, 20) indicates that:
"This had been done while its capital, nominally of the same
amount, was still only 60 per cent paid up; and even some of
this £720,000 existed in the form of subscribers bonds which,
rather sanguinely, were 'reckoned as cash'."
The Bank aggresively sought deposits from its very
beginning, devising three "methods in keeping running cash."
These methods are described by Clapham (1966, 21):
..by "Notes payable to Bearer, to be endorsed", by 
"Books or Sheets of Paper, wherein their Account to 
be entered", or by "Notes to persons to be 
accomptable". The third method is a kind of 
deposit receipt, as is shown by an August decision 
that only "accomptable notes" be given for foreign 
or inland bills of exchange until "the mony be 
actually received". The second method anticipated 
the modern pass-book: it blended with the third
under a rule by which people who drew notes 
(cheques) should have receipts for their deposits 
"and ye particulars of the Bills drawn are to be 
entered on ye side". It is the first method which 
produced those bearer notes "without which the Bank 
could hardly have carried on business"; and the 
third from which the cheque developed, for the 
holder of an "accomptable note" could create "drawn 
notes" against it, for himself or others.
The Bank of England's note issue monopoly was only
limited by the formal order that prohibited it from issuing
notes in amounts exceeding its capital. However, as early as
1696, critics of the Bank complained of the free use of notes.
Clapham (1966, 22) quotes from a broadsheet issued in
connection with the recoinage of 1695-6 entitled The Mint and
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Exchequer united:
the Bank was limited by Act of Parliment not to 
give out Bills under the Common Seal for above 
£1,200,000; and if they did every Proprietor was to 
be obliged. . . to make it good, so that they give 
out Bank Bills with interest for but £1,200,000.
But they give the Cashier's notes [observe the term 
he uses] for all sums (ad infinitum) which neither 
charge the Fund nor the Proprietors, which seems to 
be a Credit beyond the intention of the Act...and 
never practiced before by any Corporation, and 
almost a Fraud on the Subject.
In spite of frequent attacks, the Bank prospered. Its 
promoters were all influential Whigs, which ensured the 
support of both the government and the commercial world, both 
of which would run to the Bank's aid whenever it was 
threatened. This success was reflected in the price of the 
Bank's stock which hit the unprecedented price of 108 in 
January, 1696. But two dangers loomed on the horizon: the re­
coinage and the Land Bank project.
England's coinage was depreciating daily as a result of 
continual clipping and other debasement, i.e., iron and copper 
coins being silvered over. The situation was so severe that 
trade was at a standstill, attracting the attention of 
Parliment, which passed the Re-Coinage Act of 1696. This act 
forbade the exchange, sale or receipt of any coins, clipped or 
unclipped, gold or silver, for more than their nominal value. 
Additionally, the law called for a £500 fine for anyone caught 
in possession of coin clippings, plus the offender would be 
branded on the right cheek with a capital R. And, if this was 
not enough, only professional goldsmiths were allowed to buy
or sell bullion. Any house suspected of containing bullion,
could be inspected at any time. If bullion was found on the
premises, the owner was required to prove that the bullion was
not the product of clippings or melted coin. County sheriffs
were required to pay £40 to anyone who procured the conviction
of a clipper. The law went even further to provide incentives
to snitch on a person's bullion holding neighbor. Any
"clipper" who was able to secure the guilt of two other
"clippers" would receive a pardon, and the ambitious
apprentice who informed on his master was made a freeman of
the City. This "war on clipping" which ultimately led to the
harshest of penalties, execution, inspired the clergy to
protest. Two difficulties that the Exchequer was forced to
grapple with concerning the Re-coinage Act were the expense of
the re-coinage and more importantly, the decision as to
whether the coins should keep their old standard or be issued
at a lower one.
The expense of the operation totaled £2,703,164 and was
covered with difficulty. This ultimate cost was far in excess
of that estimated in the beginning. The Bank also was naive
about the consequences of the re-coinage, as Andreades ([1909]
1966, 99) writes:
Possibly too, if the Bank had realized the 
difficulties it would have to face - the 
depreciation of its stock and notes, the suspension 
of payments and of dividends - its directors, in 
spite of their courage and intelligence, would have 
refused to enter upon such a formidable adventure, 
more especially since they were already threatened 
by the Land Bank, ...
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The question of whether the new coins should keep their
old standard or be issued at a lower one was to be debated
vigorously. William Lowndes, the Secretary of the Treasury,
developed the idea that lowering the standard of fineness of
the coins while continuing to call the coins by their former
names, would defray the expense of the re-coinage. Lowndes'
report was met with a crushing rebuttle from John Locke, who
is quoted by Andreades ([1909] 1966, 101):
But this, however ordered, alters not one jot the 
value of the ounce of silver, in respect to other 
things, any more than it does its weight, this 
raising being but giving of names at pleasure to 
aliquot parts of any piece. No human power can 
raise the value of our money their double in 
respect of other commodities, and make that same 
piece or quantity of silver, under a double 
denomination, purchase double the quantity of 
pepper, wine, or lead, an instant after such 
proclamation, to what it would do an instant 
before.4
In spite of Lowndes' suggestion being the prevailing 
view, Montague's support, combined with Locke's keen analysis, 
led to passage of the resolution to preserve the old standard 
(Andreades, [1909] 1966, 90-102).
The Land Bank proposal was put forth by Dr. Hugh 
Chamberlain and John Briscoe. Their idea was to raise a 
public loan twice that of the Bank of England. This loan 
would be backed by the security of landed property and have an 
interest rate of 3% per cent. Chamberlain and Briscoe fell 
into the same trap as John Law, viewing paper money backed by 
land as equivilent, if not superior, to gold or silver. Their 
plan called for the printing of money equal to the total value
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of all property. As Andreades ([1909] 1966, 104) points out,
these promoters knew that government coercion was needed to
carry out their scheme:
The promoters did not deny that the public 
preferred the precious metals, and that in 
consequence if the Land Bank were forced to pay in 
gold, it would soon have to suspend its payments.
But they proposed to overcome this difficulty by 
making the notes inconvertible and legal tender.
The British government in the spring of 1696 was again,
as is the case with all governments, in need of money, and the
Land Bank received royal assent on April 27th by way of a Ways
and Means Bill. The bill was to raise £2,564,000, with the
interest on the loan to be covered by a salt tax. But alas,
the Land Bank act died as quickly as it was engendered. Only
£7,100 was subscribed, with £5,000 of that being the King's
investment. With the Government on the brink of bankruptcy,
the Exchequer stepped in with an issue of Exchequer bills to
fill the breach. Also the King was able to secure a loan from
the Dutch in the amount of £500,000. This scrambling for
funds was due to the fact that the government had borrowed all
that the Bank of England could lend, based on it not being
able to lend an amount more than its capital. The Bank's
bills had fallen to a ten per cent discount. Additionally,
its stock had dropped from 107 to 83 with the passage of the
Land Bank proposal and the subsequent floating of the
Exchequer bills. The Bank had many competitors, with all of
them issuing their own paper. As Carswell (1960, 18) writes:
Neither recoinage nor expanding trade could have
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been financed without paper money, which was issued
during the war in increasing quantity from the
Exchequer, the Bank of England, and the innumerable
goldsmiths and running cashes of Lombard Street.
It was the damage that the Bank received from the Land 
Bank scheme, the re-coinage, and its pesky competitors, that 
led its promoters to seek aid from the government in the form 
of monopoly status. The case was made that for the Bank to be 
useful to the State, its notes must not be faced with 
competition which "causes distrust and contracts credit 
instead of enlarging it" (Andreades [1909] 1966, 107-10).
The main provisions of the act in 1697 which gave the 
Bank of England monopoly status were:
(A) The Bank would add £1,001,171 to its capital.
(B) Subscriptions could be paid 80 per cent in
Exchequer bills, 20 per cent in Bank notes.
(C) Subscribers were to be incorporated in the company.
(D) The Bank was granted monopoly status for the
duration of its charter until August 1, 1711,
since no other banking corporation was to be 
established by an Act of Parliment.
(E) Eight per cent interest was guaranteed by the 
salt tax on tallies accepted in payment by the 
Bank.
(F) Before opening the subscription for the 
additional capital, the original capital was 
to be paid up to 100 per cent for each 
proprietor.
(G) The Bank was authorized to issue notes to the 
amount of its original capital (£1,200,000), 
plus the sums to be subscribed, on the 
condition that they were payable on demand.
(H) All property of the Bank was exempt from taxation.
(I) It was to be a felony to forge or tamper with
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Bank notes.
By consequence of this act, £200,000 in Bank notes and 
£800,000 in tallies were drawn out of circulation, thus the 
discount on the remaining Bank notes disappeared, and these 
bank notes began to circulate without bearing interest 
(Andreades [1909] 1966, 111-12).
England's war with France also ended in September, 1697, 
relieving the government treasury of the burdensome expense of 
the war, perhaps just in time. Early in 1697, over £5 million 
of short term government borrowings were due and had to be 
extended, and to add to the distress, the Malt Lottery loan 
subscription in April was a complete flop.5 The government's 
credit was repaired with the help of the Bank of England, 
three years of peace, and the successful floating of New East 
India Company stock in 1698, which in turn loaned £2 million 
to the Exchequer. This new entity, like the Bank of England, 
was allowed to use the government's debts that it owned as a 
'fund of credit' (Dickson 1967, 57) .
The tranquility of peace was not to last long, as the War 
of the Spanish Succession began when Louis XIV of France 
marched into the Spanish Netherlands, in February 1701. 
William, who hated Louis XIV, was eager to join the European 
coalition. However, the public was not in the mood for more 
of William's war and commercial unrest. In spite of three 
years of peace, taxes and interest rates had remained high, 
hangovers from the previous war debts. But with a hostile
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enemy just accross the English Channel, the English joined the 
fray in earnest, especially after the death of King William in 
1702.
The long and bloody confrontation was to again tax 
England's treasury. The Bank of England supplied short-term 
funding, with long-term funding supplied mainly by the sale of 
96 to 99 year annuities. Sidney Godolphin was named as Lord 
Treasurer in 1702 by Queen Anne, and was, in the view of 
Dickson (1967, 59) to manage "the national finances with great 
care and skill." Godolphin seemed to be able to raise funds to 
fight the French with relative ease, being aided by the 
British army's battlefield conquests, which bolstered investor 
confidence. The war's expense was running at between £8 
million to £9 million per year. This unprecedented expense 
was far greater than what could be extracted from the 
populace by way of new taxation. Thus, tax revenues through 
the end of the century were mortgaged with long term debt. 
From 1704 through 1710, the British government's long-term 
borrowings totaled £10.4 million. In addition to these loans 
from the public, Godolphin borrowed £1.7 million in Exchequer 
bills from the Bank of England, and obtained loans from the 
East India Company.
By this time the public had become anxious about the 
length of the war and its cost, both in blood and financially. 
The harsh winter of 1708-9, which led to a bad harvest the 
following summer, pushed up prices. This inflation and the
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failure of peace talks at The Hague in August, was followed by 
a bloody battle at Malplaquet in September and created an 
adverse political climate that led to a new Tory Ministry the 
following year. The new Ministry sacked Godolphin on August 
8, 1720, with Robert Harley being named Chancellor of the
Exchequer two days later. In May of the following year Harley 
was named Lord Treasurer (Dickson 1967, 59-64).
In the meantime, Sir John Blunt and his partners had 
transformed the Sword Blade Company into a finance company in 
order, as Carswell (1960, 34) says, to "annex for themselves 
as large a part as they could of the politico-financial empire 
that had been carved out by the Bank of England." The Sword 
Blade Company's business was to acquire estates with the 
proceeds from stock issues that were paid for in government 
obligations. The obligations chosen were Army Debentures, 
issued by the Paymaster of the Forces. The market price of 
these debentures was 85, for which the holders were then 
offered Sword Blade stock valued at 100. The government was 
thus traded their own debt instument, at a discount, for their 
land.
In the spring of 1704, the Bank of England took offense 
to the activities of the- Sword Blade Company, serving notice 
to the Treasury that the monopoly clause of the Act of 1697 
was being violated by Mr. Blunt and his company. Blunt 
contended that the Act of 1697 only prohibited rival 
corporations set up by an Act of Parliment, which the Sword
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Blade Company had not. By May of 1707, the Bank managed to 
get the Treasury's promise that it would take action against 
Sword Blade Company and to fortify the Bank's privileges.
The Sword Blade Company provided good, healthy 
competition for the Bank of England, but the Treasury needed 
money, and the Bank was willing to lend £1% million at 4% per 
cent (Carswell, 1960, 34-37). With the Treasury getting what 
it wanted, it in turn extended the Bank's charter to 1732, 
along with allowing the bank to double its existing capital of 
£2,201,171. The additional capital was raised before noon the 
same day subscriptions became available. Andreades ([1909] 
1966, 122) provides a breakdown of the Bank's capital position 
at this point:
Capital of the B a n k ..............  £2 .201.171
This Capital doubled....................  £4.402.343
And increased by the £400,000 now advanced £4,802,343
To which must be added for the Exchequer bills£1.775.027
Total £6,577,370
The activities of the Bank, along with those of the Sword 
Blade Company and the East India Company, ensured that there 
was plenty of money available. As Carswell (1960, 43) writes: 
"The war had encouraged, not checked, the advance of wealth 
and the multiplication of paper. It was no uncommon thing, 
now, for a man to have made a 'plum', as current slang 
described £100,000."
As was the case in the Bank's original charter, the 
Bank's note issue was only restricted by the amount of its 
capital. Andreades ([1909] 1966, 124) quotes H.D. Macleod's
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stinging criticism of this scheme:
Now, to a certain extent, this plan might be 
attended with no evil consequences, but it is 
perfectly clear that its principle is utterly 
vicious. There is nothing so wild or absurd in 
John Law's Theory of Money as this. His scheme of 
basing a paper currency upon land is sober sense 
compared to it. If for every debt the Government 
incurs an equal amount of money is to be created, 
why, here we have the philosopher's stone at once.
What is the long sought Eldorado compared to this?
Even there the gold required to be picked up and 
fashioned into coin.
The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Harley, had 
inherited from his successor, Godolphin, a mountain of debt, 
and the immediate problem of having to satisfy the creditors 
of the Navy, all of whom were anxious to be paid. Harley 
received proposals from John Blunt and George Caswell of the 
Sword Blade Company, and from Sir Ambrose Crowley, a large 
contractor with the Navy Board. The Blunt-Caswell plan 
essentially called for the incorporation of the Navy and other 
creditors, along with cancelling the state's debt to them in 
exchange for stock.
Harley was not flush with options. He did not have the 
cash to pay the floating debt, and had no alternative to the 
Blunt-Caswell proposal. On June 12, 1711, the plan was given 
royal assent. The government's short term creditors, holding 
close to £9 million, were to be incorporated under the Great 
Seal as 'the Governor and Company of Merchants of Great 
Britian Trading to the South Seas and other parts of America 
and for encouraging the Fishery.'
This new entity, in exchange for extinguishing £9 million
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in government debt, was given a monopoly on trade with South 
America, on the east coast from the River Orinoco to Tierra 
del Fuego, and for the entire west coast. This region had for 
some time held an allure of riches to the British. Thus, it 
was the perfect vehicle to placate the government's creditors, 
given its potental for high profits. In fact the British, 
since the reign of Queen Elizabeth, had attempted to break the 
Spanish stronghold on the Americas, either by force or 
licence. This attempt, like the others, was to fail. The 
opening of this market would come much later, in the 
nineteenth century, with the political independence of the 
Spanish colonies.
The establishment of the South Sea Company coincided with 
the British expedition in August, 1711 against Quebec, and the 
planning of an Anglo-Dutch attack on the Spanish West Indies. 
Dickson (1967, 66) theorizes that: "It can therefore be
regarded as part of a three-pronged drive for empire in the 
new world, though there is little doubt that in fact this 
grand design was three-quarters bluff, intended to assist 
Harley's peace negotiations."
At war's end in 1713, the South Sea Company's trading 
rights were defined. The company had permission to send, 
annually, one 500 ton ship to trade at the fairs of Cartagena 
or Veracruz and to send 150 ton supply ships to supply food to 
the factories. In addition, it was given a thirty year 
contract to supply African slaves to New Spain. This contract
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called for the delivery of 4,800 slaves per year of a 
specified condition, with the company paying taxes on 4,000 of 
these. The King of Spain was to receive 10 per cent of the 
company's slave trade profit in addition to the 28 per cent of 
all other trading profits. This limited amount of trading 
privilege, along with the payment to the King of Spain of his 
share, left but a meager return for the company.
It was to take over two years to even come close to 
selling out the South Sea subscription. The books were 
finally closed on Christmas of 1713, with a total of 
£9,177,968 having been raised, an amount smaller than the 
£9,471,324 envisaged by the South Sea act. The company was 
to receive annually £550,678 in interest and £8,000 for 
management from the government. In the beginning the 
government paid promptly. But this situation changed, and by 
the summer of 1715, interest was six months in arrears. With 
no interest income coming in and little progress made in 
starting trade with Spanish America, the company was quickly 
in financial trouble. In 1712, 1713 and 1714 the proprietors 
were given the option of receiving dividends in cash or in 
bonds. In 1715, no choice was given, dividends were paid in 
bonds; and in 1716, dividends were paid in the form of stock. 
Fortunately for the subscribers the stock was now at par.
From 1712 through 1715, the government used South Sea 
stock to pay creditors and to secure loans. "For the use of 
the public" £2,371,402 of the company's capital had been set
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aside; plus £500,000 in stock was created for the government's 
use by the South Sea Act. This use of funds was not popular, 
and eventually, in 1717, the company was able to shed its 
encumbrances, with Parliment proclaiming that government 
deficiences were to be paid, in the future, out of the General 
Fund. Also, by this date progress had been made on the trade 
front and the company appeared to have weathered its difficult 
beginnings.
By the use of the South Sea Company vehicle, the 
government was able to rid itself of its floating debt. 
However this repayment did nothing to fund the burden of the 
war expense that had reached its height at that time (1711). 
To fund this shortfall, Harley created Exchequer bills on a 
massive scale to handle the short-term needs, and used the 
Bank of England as receiver for £9.2 million in lottery loans 
floated in 1711 and 1712 to cover the revenue deficit. 
Harley went on to float smaller lottery loans in 1713 and 
1714, with the Bank acting as receiver. One loan was to 
discharge the debts of the Civil List, and the other was to go
to the public service (Dickson, 1967, 59-75).
The War of the Spanish Succession was finally over in 
1713. England and the other participants had each created a 
huge mountain of debt with which they were forced to contend. 
On September 29, 1714, Britian's national debt stood at
£40,357,011. Additionally, there were over £4% million in
Exchequer Bills outstanding, not to mention debts of back pay
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to the army and foreign subsidies of unknown amounts. The 
government undertook a massive restructure of its debts, in 
hopes of lessening the interest burden.
This restructure was accomplished through three 
conversion Acts. The first called for the conversion of the 
1711-12 lottery loans outstanding and half of the 1705 
Bankers' Annuities debt to be exchanged into five per cent 
stock to be managed by the Bank of England. The second act 
reduced the interest rate on various debts owed to the South 
Sea Company and the Bank of England. The third act 
established a sinking fund for reduction of the national debt, 
and called for reducing the interest rate on Exchequer bills 
to 1% per cent.
These measures, which were implemented between 1715-1719, 
were for the most part successful, reducing the government's 
annual interest charge by 13 per cent and providing welcome 
relief to the state. Although the yield on government 
obligations had been lessened most holders of the government 
stock felt their principal was more secure. This feeling was 
reflected in the market price of government stock. At the end 
of 1717, the stock was trading four points above its par 
value.
However, there was one finance problem left to be solved, 
that of the high and virtually perpetual interest to be paid 
to annuitants. These annuity holders would have to be 
persuaded to exchange their annuities for redeemable stock.
1 0 5
The Treasury turned to the South Sea Company in 1719 with a 
plan for this conversion. The interest payable on these 
annuities was £135,000 yearly, thus the Treasury calculated 
that this interest should be capitalized at a market price of 
eleven and a half years purchase, or £1,552,500. To be added 
to this was £168,750 in back interest owed the company and the 
£778,750 the company was to lend to the Exchequer. Thus, the 
total increase in the state's debt was to be £2.5 million as 
a part of this conversion.
In the spring of 1719, it turned out that only two-thirds 
of the subscription was taken. As a result the South Sea 
Company's capital increased by £1,746,844 to a total of 
£11,746,844. The subscription, which was payable in fifths, 
was fully funded in December, 1719, with the company receiving 
£592,800. The Exchequer was to be paid £544,142. This was 
raised by selling £520,000 in new stock at 114 in July. The 
company's claims against the state now stood at £193,582. 
Thus, when all was said and done, the company had made a tidy 
profit of £242,240 from the operation, and had £24,000 in 
stock still in hand. This success led to a much bigger 
operation of the same kind the following year.
Across the Channel, in 1719, John Law's System was at its 
height, and was viewed with more than a twinge of jealousy and 
concern from the Brits. Law's debt conversion had already 
inspired John Blunt and his fellow Sword Blade partners. But 
what concerned the British government was the ever increasing
1 0 6
flight of capital leaving London to seek the much-talked-about
returns to be enjoyed in Paris. With further debt conversions
being contemplated by the government, it did not want this
loss of capital to hinder its plans. These fears were raised
when rumors began to circulate that John Law was opening a
large "bear" account to depress British Government stocks. At
the same time, another rumor had him buying the East India and
South Sea Companies so as to become the financial czar of
Europe. But the government's worries were pointed in the
wrong direction. John Law's system was about to fall apart,
and besides, Law had a very ambitious imitator in Sir John
Blunt who was about to embark on his own grand scheme.
Two categories of debt were particularly troublesome to
the government. One was the ninety-six and ninety-nine year
annuities which had been sold when interest rates were high,
and could not be redeemed by a lump-sum payoff or a sinking
fund (they could be redeemed only if annuitants were pursuaded
voluntarily). The other category was miscellaneous debts
which were being redeemed by Walpole's sinking fund, at
approxiamately £750,000 per year. Total government debt
service, not including management charges and amounts
converted into stocks already, was over £1.5 million per year,
and as Carswell (1960, 103-4) relates:
... this was the amount negotiators at the Treasury 
were concerned to disguise as a single huge 
redeemable annuity to the South Sea Company. For 
this purpose it was necessary to represent the 
whole as a capital sum... To keep one's head in the
maze of South Sea finance, it is important to lay
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firm hold on the fact that the capital figures were
mere paper calculations.
The capitalization of the redeemable debt was straight­
forward and totaled approximately £16 million. As for the 
irredeemable annuities, the capitalization was much more 
difficult to formulate. The overriding objective was to 
reduce the cost of this debt as much as possible. This was 
accomplished by capitalizing these annuities at their original 
term of years, but without regard to the date they were 
issued. Ninety-nine and ninety-six year annuities were capped 
at five per cent for twenty years, with the thirty-two year 
and the Lottery annuities being capped at six per cent 
interest for fourteen years. The total capitalization for the 
annuities was £15 million, making the grand total £31 million.
Against this staggering sum of £31 million, an equal 
amount of South Sea stock was to materialize when debt holders 
would voluntarily exchange one for the other. The amount of 
stock that the company would issue for any given debt was to 
be decided by the market. Thus, as was the case with the 1719 
conversion, the higher the price of the stock, the more 
profitable the conversion would be for the Company.
The Company's deal with the government, in regards to the 
conversion, was very precise: for every pound of yearly
expense spared the government, the Company received a pound a 
year from the government. The exception to this was on 
irredeemables where the Company would receive only 14s for 
each pound the government was saved. This was worth £40,000
1 0 8
a year to the Exchequer. The ultimate savings to the 
government was to come after seven years when the government 
would only pay 4 per cent on all of the converted debt, a 
savings of roughly £400,000. In addition this obligation 
could be redeemed. Thus, the government was allowed to pay 
off the debt in total whenever it might be able. It was 
calculated that if the interest savings were applied according 
to sinking fund principles, Britian's debt would be retired in 
twenty-five years. And if the prospect of being debt free was 
not enough incentive, the Company offered a carrot that was to 
be paid at the end of the one year conversion term: a gift to 
the Exchequer of £3 million, payable in four quarterly 
installments, to be used to pay off redeemable debts incurred 
before 1716, with any amounts that remained, being available 
for use in whatever way the Exchequer desired.
This £3 million sweetener also served as an insurance 
policy for Blunt. If all of the redeemables were not 
converted, this £3 million would be available to pay these 
debts off. Thus, with the Bank of England owning most of 
these notes, the threat of repayment was enough for the Bank, 
which would not be able to reinvest the cash at attractive 
returns, to convert the debts it held for South Sea stock. 
Blunt knew that he would never earn, in the normal course of 
business, the £3 million in cash needed to make this promised 
gift, for every penny of income would have to go toward 
payment of the five per cent dividend on the capital. What
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Blunt was counting on was a rise in the share price of South
Sea stock to generate the needed funds.
Blunt calculated correctly that if a boom in Stock prices
was engendered, holders of government annuities would quickly
exchange this debt for the opportunity to make huge capital
gains relatively quickly. The fuel needed for this boom was
endogenous to the plan, as Carswell (1960, 108) points out:
The plan amounted to the injection into the economy 
which was already booming, of another £5 million or 
so of new money-ten times the injection of the 
previous year-with a simultaneous lowering of 
interest rates.
The final days of 1719 brought news that spured the 
fortunes of the South Sea Company. Peace between Spain and 
England had been declared on the terms of the latter, opening 
up trade passages to South America. The time had come for 
Blunt's grand plan to be presented to the Parliment. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Aislabie, laid the plan 
before the House of Commons on the basis that the plan was 
forthcoming from the Company. Secretary Craggs followed with 
the suggestion that the House receive the plan. But to 
Aislabie's dismay, an influential Anglo-Irish Whig, Thomas 
Brodrick, suggested that the House consider other offers 
before it accepted this one, and the measure was not voted on. 
This allowed the Bank of England time to make a rival 
proposal.
The Bank was suddenly put in a position of having to 
fight for the top financial perch upon which it had sat for so
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many years. For ten years the South Sea Company had slowly 
increased the amount of annual payments it received from the 
government, to over £500,000, and now the Bank was faced with 
the possibility that the South Sea Company would be the 
receipient of £2 million in annual annuity payments, at its 
expense. It was feared that the loss of this conversion would 
relegate the Bank to being just an ordinary commercial bank, 
with its old enemy, the Sword Blade Company, the credit- 
creating agency behind the South Sea Company, depriving them 
of their lofty position within the London money market.
The bidding for the conversion was spirited. The 
critical deal point, which the Bank and the Company continued 
to make more and more attractive, was the amount to be given 
as a gift to the Exchequer. The South Sea Company's original 
£3 million was increased to £3% million, only to be increased 
to £5% million with the Bank's bid. But the Company finally 
won out by raising the stakes of the gift to £4 million 
certain to the Exchequer, with the possibility of as much as 
another £3% million. The additional amount was dependent upon 
the amount of debt that was actually converted. Also, the 
Company promised to make the annuity open for redemption in 
four years rather than the seven years originally proposed, 
and, at the same time, reduce the interest rate to four per 
cent. Finally the Company offered to circulate £1 million in 
Exchequer bills with no management fee or interest. This was 
an offer that the Bank of England could not match, and the
Ill
South Sea proposal passed in the House with ease. With the 
news of the Company's triumph, the traders in Exchange Alley 
bid the price of its stock up thirty-one points, from 129 to 
160, and what a journalist of the time called 'the English 
Mississippi' was underway (Carswell 1960, 98-113).
As the debt conversion was being negotiated and 
subsequently bid for, English pounds continued to flow across 
the channel into the awaiting tempest that John Law's system 
had now become. After hitting a high in January, 1720, 
Mississippi Company shares had fallen. Law was now desperatly 
trying to hold up the shares at the expense of his inflation 
ravaged currency, and the financial freedom of the French 
people. Law's proposals put forth in the spring, in hopes of 
salvaging the currency, were met with suspicion from the 
saviest of London's investors, who began to pull their 
money out of Paris and return it to the London market.
John Blunt and the rest of the South Sea stock promoters, 
like John Law in the case of the Mississippi shares, sparked 
the fire of speculation in the Company's shares, by allowing 
the governing class the opportunity to be in on the ground 
floor of the stock issue. This virtually assured them a 
profit. Nearly all of London's bourgousie had purchased their 
shares prior to the publishing of the Bill calling for the 
debt conversion, on March 17th. Subsequently, between March 
19th and 21st, the share price soared from 218 to 32 0 on 
reports from Paris that John Law was taking criticism from the
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Regent, and having nightmares. A second reading of the Bill 
on the 21st inspired a debate on the 23rd over whether the 
terms of the conversion should be fixed in advance and 
be written into the statute. The debate lasted six hours, 
with contrary news causing the price of the shares to trade in 
a broad range of 110 points, between 270 and 380. The company 
prevailed, which propelled the stock to 400 for a brief period 
before it retreated back to 330.
On March 25th, the Bank of England was further 
humiliated. It was announced that the entire debt held by the 
Bank (£3.75 million) that was not to be redeemed by the South 
Sea Company would be repaid by the end of the year. The 
payoff of this debt meant that the Bank would no longer be a 
national institution. Any support from those individuals in 
government that the Bank had enjoyed was now firmly behind the 
South Sea Company, with more than a few having been given 
shares in the company to enjoy in the speculation and reap the 
financial reward. The Bill finally received Royal Assent on 
April 7th. The Company had provided £574,500 worth of stock 
in bribes to government officials to get the bill passed, and 
now London was poised for the boom. Carswell (1960, 127)
added up the liabilities that the Company would incur over the 
next year (£11.4 million), from which the profits of the 
conversion would have to cover. A share price of 140 was 
needed to break even. On April 7th the stock stood at 3 35.
The South Sea Company's subscription and debt conversion
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was begun in April, with the Company's primary motive being 
very clear: to market its new stock while the share price was 
rising, while defering the second conversion of government 
debt until August, when its share price was at its height 
(1,000). This would maximize its exchange advantage over 
government debt holders. The Company's first stock
subscription was on April 14th, with 2,250,000 issued at a per 
share price of 300. The terms of payment were twenty per cent 
down, with the balance to be paid for over sixteen months with 
calls every two months.
The second issue came two weeks later, on April 29th, 
with 1% million issued at a price of 400. The terms quickly 
became more liberal, ten per cent down, with the balance over 
twenty months payable in nine calls at three to four month 
intervals. With the market frantically trading up the stock, 
the Company made its third and largest issue on June 17th, 
issuing 5 million at 1,000 per share. Terms again called for 
ten per cent down, but payments were stretched over fifty-four 
months, with nine payments made semi-annually. The fourth, 
and final issue was made on the 24th of August, with 1,2 50,000 
issued at, again, a 1,000 share price. The terms of this 
issue called for twenty per cent down, with the balance to be 
paid over the next thirty-six months. Had all payment calls 
been made, the Company would have received £75,2 50,000 over 
the subsequent four and one-half years! The market had two 
vehicles with which to trade the South Sea Company: the actual
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shares and the subscription receipts.
Demand for the shares was enormous, as exibited both by
the increase in price and how quickly the shares were snapped
up during the four offerings. The first was said to have been
filled in an hour, the second and third issues in a few hours,
and the final issue in three hours. There was even talk of an
additional issue, however it was scuttled in early September
when the market was beginning to crumble.
The decision by John Blunt and the rest of the South Sea
director's to begin with stock issues or "Money Subscriptions"
as they were known, rather than the conversion of the
government debt was driven by the following motives, outlined
by Dickson (1967, 129):
...first, to the knowledge that they could legally 
increase their capital without any limit, provided 
they applied part of the proceeds to paying off the 
government's creditors; second, to their wish to 
take the exchanges in stages, rather than spoiling 
the market by taking them all at once. A third 
motive was, of course, their wish to cash as 
quickly as possible the cheque which the Government 
had handed them without waiting to see if there 
were the funds to meet it.
When the Company began to convert the annuities to South 
Sea stock, the holders of these annuities were eager to get 
hold of the new South Sea shares and sell them in the now 
booming market, but the Company was not keen on a flood of 
shares pouring into the market, putting a damper on the share 
price. Annuitants or their attorneys showed up at South Sea 
House, with their title documents in tow, to sign their names 
and the annual amounts they received into the books. These
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documents were headed by an introductory statement that most
of them, unfortunately, neglected to read. This preamble gave
three South Sea clerks the power to subscribe the capital
stock in whatever way the company saw fit to the annuitants.
Rather than delivering shares, a book entry was made,
with the actual stock not being delivered until December 30,
1720. This method was repeated in July and again for the
third and, as it turned out, final debt conversion in August.
The government creditors had thus exchanged their debts for no
more than the expectation of possessing South Sea stock.
The primary holders of the government debts were, not the
unsophisticated masses, but no less than the powerful Bank of
England, Million Bank, and a host of wealthy, powerful
individuals. Dickson (1967, 134,136) gives the result of
their collective gullibility:
80% of the long and short annuities (the 
Irredeemables) and 85% of Government ordinary stock 
(the Redeemables) were converted into South Sea 
stock. The company's nominal capital increased by 
over £2 6m., on which the Government was to pay 
interest partly at 5% and partly at 4% until 
midsummer 1727, then entirely at 4%. Despite 
bitter pressure on the part of the disappointed 
public creditors in the winter of 1720-1, the 
exchanges were not rescinded,...
When it put the accounts together, the company 
found that, thanks to the rise in the market price 
of its stock, it had been able to persuade holders 
of £26m. of the £31m. subscribable debts to 
exchange them for South Sea stock so over-valued 
that they only obtained £8.5m. of it.
By the late spring, early summer of 1720, foreign buying 
began to push the price of South Sea stock ever higher, as
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investors fled Paris in ever increasing numbers. Also, specie 
from Holland began to arrive in London to be used for the 
purchase of shares. At the same time the Company gave 
Exchange Alley a liquidity injection, by giving the directors 
the power to lend money on the security of South Sea stock. 
This action produced £11 million in loans. At the same time, 
the Bank of England was throwing gasoline on the fire in the 
form of loans on its own stock. The government also got into 
the act by lending the South Sea Company £1 million in 
Exchequer bills that were subsequently used to purchase the 
Company's shares. Even the Royal African Company, which lent 
£102,000, joined the party.
The South Sea share price was now rocketing upward. At 
the start of June the price was 600 and by the end of that 
month it stood near 1,000. This tremendous speculation led to 
a flood of other proposals for new companies in Exchange 
Alley. Many of the proposed operations were swindles, with 
promoters marketing a particular stock with the tool of low 
down payments and deferred payment plans, only to confiscate 
the down payments and leave the city. Some, however, were 
respectable ventures. The number of "bubble company" 
proposals hit its height in June with eighty-eight being 
promoted in that month. Only eleven more were sponsered the 
entire rest of the year.
Speculation was not limited just to South Sea shares or 
these "bubble companies." Other securities rose as well,
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along with the price of land, as the following quote of Lord 
Bristol, who was negotiating with William Astell over the 
price of a land parcel from Dickson (1967, 147), illustrates: 
"land has almost doubly increased in value since ye time I 
first fix'd for your final answer."6
Ironically, at the height of speculation in June, the pin 
that would eventually pop the bubble was being fashioned by 
the British government. On June 11th, the King's assent was 
given to the Bubble Act, which made it an offense to 'presume 
to act' as a corporate body, or to divert an existing charter 
to unauthorized ends. In August, four companies were found to 
be in violation of the Act: the English Copper Company, the 
Royal Lustering Company, the York Buildings Company, and the 
Welsh Copper Company. Although the Act had been enacted to 
keep capital from being channelled away from the South Sea 
Company, the writs against the four companies signaled the 
beginning of the steep fall in the price of South Sea shares. 
In spite of desparate attempts to increase the demand for 
shares by declaring a thirty’per cent Christmas dividend (ala 
John Law), a torrent of sell orders descended upon Exchange 
Alley. By mid-September the share price had dropped to 520, 
and by October the price was 200, on the its way to 120 in 
December. The bubble had exploded (Dickson 1967, 122-53).
After the 'house of cards' had finally been leveled, the 
financial prospects of the South Sea Company were put in a 
clearer light. The Company's only asset, besides trading
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privileges that were for the most part unexploitable, was a 
stream of income from the Exchequer in the amount of £2 
million per year. The bad news was that expenses for the 
coming year were £14.5 million. The South Sea Company was 
hopelessly insolvent (Carswell 1960, 238-39).
In spite of the Company technically being bankrupt, it 
was able to stay in business for many years through a massive 
reorganization engineered by Sir Robert Walpole. Walpole's 
ability to sift through the wreckage and decide who the 
winners and who the losers would be from this financial train 
wreck made him a revered and beloved man of such high 
reputation that he went on to rule England as Prime Minister 
for twenty years. This reverence for Walpole is evidenced by 
Clough's (1968, 217) comment: "He [Walpole] was able,
moreover, to save for government bondholders about 60 per cent 
of their investment, and he was successful in salvaging enough 
of the South Sea Company to keep the organization in business, 
eventually, however, with government securities as its only 
assets." Clough must not realize that government securities 
were the only asset the company ever had. Furthermore, we can 
only wonder if the government bondholders at the time thought 
that taking a 40 per cent 'haircut' on their investment was a 
good deal.
Far from being an isolated mania engendered only by the 
urges of a populace with the gambling spirit, the South Sea 
Bubble was the inevitable result of a government living beyond
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its means. Britian had the help of some enterprising
entrepenuers who, with the example of John Law, produced the
various schemes and institutions through which to create the 
money needed to pay for its wars and largess. As is always 
the case when paper money is created illegitimately, some 
groups benefited at the expense of others, with speculation 
taking the place of honest work and production as the way to 
acheive wealth. This environment of frenzied speculation led 
to political corruption, great disparities of wealth, fraud, 
and violence. As aptly put by Andreades ([1909] 1966, 143- 
44) :
But all these must not lead us to infer that the 
South Sea crisis was beneficial to England. It had 
produced enormous agitation and an unjust 
redistribution of wealth and had very nearly ruined 
the Hanoverian monarchy. . . . Those who shared in 
it knew perfectly well that it was only a fraud, 
but hoped notwithstanding to make some profit out 
of it. ...These speculators-and this is one of the 
most painful features of the crisis-represented all 
classes of society, and things were so arranged
that the poorest man might ruin himself as easily
as the millionaire.
The big winner in this story of financial debauchery was, 
of course, the British government, which was able to transform 
an insurmountable mountain of debt, through their agent, the 
South Sea Company, and at the expense of the public creditors, 
into a much more manageable expense. In effect, a portion of 
the government's debt service was repudiated, with the 
financial pain being thrust upon those people who were least 
able to shoulder it, an unsuspecting public.
The South Sea bubble episode was relatively short, as
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compared with that of the Mississippi Bubble. The difference 
between the two bubbles was that Law used the Royal Bank to 
print more money, and thus sustained the system for a longer 
period of time. Conversely, the Bank of England stood apart 
from the South Sea government debt conversion. As the bubble 
burst, the Bank of England, concerned about its own survival, 
discontinued discounting, called in loans made against its own 
stock and loans made to the East India Company, and sold 
customers interest-bearing notes in an attempt to raise cash 
(Giuseppi 1966,44).
If the Bank of England had been successful in out-bidding 
the South Sea Company for the conversion of the government 
debt, a replay of the Mississippi bubble is a distinct 
possibility. The likely result being a British populace 
suffering even greater financial pain.
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CHAPTER NOTES
1. Hearth tax was a tax on all dwellings except cottages, and was 
levied based upon the number of hearths or stoves that were in a 
given dwelling. The tax was very unpopular and as can easily be 
imagined, hard to collect.
2. The £300,000 difference was to be raised by annuities.
3. £10,000 was the maximum subscription allowable. Ten other
contributors besides the King and Queen contributed the maximum 
amount.
4. This quote is taken from Locke's pamphlet entitled, Further 
considerations concerning raising the value of money. Andreades 
indicates that this pamphlet has been reprinted at the end of, 
McCulloch's Principles of Political Economy.
5. The Malt lottery was to issue 140,000 £10 tickets, raising 
£1,400,000. Only 1,763 tickets were sold, the rest of the tickets 
were used by the Exchequer as cash. (Dickson, 1967, 49)
6. Quoted from Letter Books of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol 
(Wells, 1894), ii. 126, Bristol to Astell August 4, 1720.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONi INCREASES IN THE 
SUPPLY OF MONEY. SPECULATIVE 
BUBBLES. AND THE AUSTRIAN 
MALINVESTMENT THEORY
As we seek explanations for the causes of speculative 
bubbles, the forthcoming responses from the different strains 
of modern mainstream economic thought are far from satisfying. 
The rational expectations (Rat-X) school, after much muddling 
of figures and formulas, comes to the conclusion that bubbles 
are not possible since all market participants act rationally 
and can foretell the future. As this paper has shown, 
speculative bubbles do occur, and market participants (people) 
cannot foretell the future, and do not necessarily act 
rationally. Econometrics has again struck out in its attempts 
to explain, let alone predict, the behavior of humans. But, of 
course, rather than admit that their tools are inadequate, the 
Rat-X group concludes that, empirically, it cannot be shown 
that speculative bubbles exist. Thus, they do not. This 
otiose view flies in the face of historical fact.
John Maynard Keynes, whose school of thought when 
followed as policy is the modern catalyst for speculative 
bubbles, wrote at length concerning speculation. Keynes 
recognized full well the damage that speculation and
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malinvestment could inflict on people. What Keynes did not
recognize was the root cause of these episodes. Instead, he
focused on the results which he thought were the causes. The
following paragraph from Keynes (1964, 161) sums up his view
of speculation:
..there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large 
proportion of our positive activities depend on 
spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical 
expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or 
economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do 
something positive,. . . can only be taken as a
result of animal spirits.
Keynes held the view, as reflected in the above quote, 
that these "animal spirits" lead to damaging speculation,.and 
he of course prescribed government restrictions on investment 
to solve the problem.
So, on one end of the spectrum, we have the rational 
expectation camp, which says that all people (market 
participants) are rational, and, being in possession of all 
available data, can foretell the future. One hundred eighty 
degrees opposite the Rat-X group is Keynes, who saw all 
people as being possessed by "animal spirits", i.e., being 
irrational, which will thus cause frequent instability and 
speculation in an economy, with the obvious cure being 
intervention by the State, which is assumed to be rational.
By reflecting back on what has been written in this 
paper, it is obvious that speculative bubbles can and do 
occur. And if Keynes' "animal spirits" were the cause of 
speculative bubbles, these bubbles would have happened
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continually, ad infinitum, throughout history. Given the fact 
that this "animal spirit" is an inherent human trait, that is 
not turned off and on, these speculative episodes would be 
constantly engendered through no other impetus but the human 
spirit. This is clearly not the case.
The three speculative bubble episodes explored in this 
paper, besides having the obvious similarity that they all 
occurred, share the common trait that a government sanctioned 
bank, along with government policy, created large increases in 
the supply of money in each economy, prior to and during these 
episodes. Each episode was in its own way different, 
especially the Tulipmania. However, the results were the 
same: boom, speculation, crash, then financial pain.
Another common element to all three experiences was a man 
named John Law. Law was born in 1671 after the Tulipmania 
bubble, but he studied the workings of the Bank of Amsterdam, 
which played a part in the Tulipmania, greatly admiring its 
operation and its positive effect on the Dutch economy. The 
Bank of Amsterdam was the centerpost of the strongest economy 
in the world because of the soundness of its operation and 
therefore the Dutch currency. The Bank accepted coin and 
bullion and issued bank money against these deposits. All 
bank money were backed one hundred per cent (in the Bank's 
beginning) by specie and thus great confidence in this money 
was engendered.
Because of the soundness of this money and the Dutch free
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coinage policy, immense amounts of coin and bullion flowed to 
Amsterdam from other parts of Europe, America and Japan. This 
torrent of coin and bullion is reflected in the deposits of 
the Bank of Amsterdam, which increased an estimated 60 per 
cent in the five year period (1633-1638) which encompasses the 
Tulipmania episode. Total mint output of the South 
Netherlands for the 163 6-8 period was two and a half times 
greater than the amount minted from 1630-2. This huge influx 
of money, albeit sound money, led, as Del Mar ([1895] 1969, 
351) writes, to "the curious mania of buying tulips at prices 
often exceeding that of the ground on which they were grown." 
The culmination of Tulipmania came in January 1637 when, for 
example, the price of the Witte Croonen tulip bulb rose 
approximately 26 times in the space of that month, only to 
crash to a price of one-twentieth of its peak price the first 
week in February of that same year.
After studying the operations of the Bank of Amsterdam, 
during the course of his travels throughout Europe, Law began 
to formulate monetary theories and banking proposals, which in 
turn he advanced to States throughout Europe. Law believed 
that silver and gold were ill suited to serve as money, that 
their value was subject to fluctuation depending upon supply. 
Initially, Law's plan called for paper money that was backed 
by land, thinking that this paper money would better satisfy 
the qualities necessary in money.
Law was initially unsuccessful in selling his proposal to
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any European governments, even that of his native Scotland. 
His views also began to change, as he studied other banks 
including the Bank of England, which was formed in 1694. Law 
was impressed with the Bank of England's ability to pay for 
England's war against France, with paper money. He began to 
view stocks as money that was superior to silver, thinking 
that they were inflation proof.
Law was finally able to find a taker for his scheme in 
1716, when he began the General Bank in Paris. France at that 
time was devastated economically, after fighting the War of 
the Spanish Succession and piling up huge debts. Law was 
intent on refinancing this government debt so as to lower 
interest rates and stimulate the languid French economy. To 
accomplish this, Law began the Company of the West, whose only 
asset to speak of was the trading privilege with Louisiana. 
After selling shares to capitalize the company, Law refinanced 
the government's depreciated debt.
Law then set out to put his system in motion. He was 
finally able to convince the Regent to make the General Bank 
part of the State, with it becoming the Royal Bank in late 
1718. Law then merged three companies together to form what 
has been commonly known as the Mississippi Company. With the 
Royal Bank issuing 159.9 million livres in fresh banknotes, 
the price of the Mississippi Company shares began to take off 
in early 1719. In the second half of that same year, with 
Royal Bank issuing another 220.6 million livres worth of
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banknotes, combined with Law's low down payment, and the 
extended terms method of marketing the stock, the price 
continued to climb, allowing Law to issue more shares. He 
then used using the capital to refinance more of the 
government's debt.
The share price peaked at 10,100 livres, in January 1720, 
aided by increases in the supply of money that was to total 
2.1 billion livres by May of 1720. In the spring of 1720, the 
system was beginning to unravel, leading Law to issue a series 
of decrees attempting first to devalue silver, then to devalue 
shares and banknotes. With investors attempting to sell 
shares and convert the proceeds to specie, Law frantically 
tried to keep the system afloat, and in fact was able to do 
so, given the lack of specie due to hoarding and Law's 
policies. But by the end of the year, the bubble had been 
deflated. In September, shares were 43 per cent of the high. 
Indeed, in pound sterling terms, Mississippi shares were only 
14 per cent of their highs, which more truly reflects the 
consequences of the massive increase in the supply of money 
engineered by Law.
While speculation was running rampant, commodity prices 
were exploding over the course of four years, not only in 
Paris, but in other cities in France. Some cities experienced 
worse inflation, and for some it was not as severe. The big 
loser was, of course, the laboring class, whose wages never 
caught up with prices.
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Law's "success" with the Mississippi System, was viewed 
with envy and fear from across the Channel in England. 
Britain, like France, had heavily encumbered itself, with the 
help of the Bank of England and Lottery loans, to fight the 
war of the Spanish Succession. The Bank of England was an 
innovator in the creation of paper money and checking 
accounts. Its entire capital base was made up of government 
debt, with its charter allowing it to issue notes up to the 
amount of its capital.
The Bank of England was constantly hounded by competitors 
who wanted a share of the Bank's lucrative business. One of 
these competitors was the Sword Blade Company, which was 
headed by Sir John Blunt. This Sword Blade Company was to 
serve as the credit creating arm of Blunt's South Sea Company. 
In 1711, this company was given the monopoly rights to trade 
with South America. Unfortunately, the Spanish were to 
greatly hinder the exploitation of this monopoly. In exchange 
for this monopoly, the company refinanced £9 million in 
government debt.
But this was just the beginning. In 1719, with total 
government debt well over £40 million, the South Sea Company 
proposed a massive refinance of the government's debt, ala 
John Law. The Company was forced to bid against the Bank of 
England for this operation, and finally won out, by offering 
extraordinary terms and extensive bribery. Once the bid had 
been won, the price of South Sea stock took off, which was
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necessary for Blunt's plan to work. The Company would make 
its money on the conversion, by exploiting the exchange 
difference between the government debt and inflated share 
prices.
The South Sea shares moved quickly to 1,000, with the aid 
of Company loans totaling £11 million, the government loaning 
£1 million, the Bank of England loaning money on its own stock 
and the Royal African company lending in £102,000. With 
plenty of money in Exchange Alley there were plenty of 
promoters hawking what came to be known as "bubble companies." 
Eighty-eight of these companies were promoted just in the 
month of June, 1720.
The British government, at the urging of the South Sea 
Company, passed the Bubble Act which effectively shut down 
these upstart bubble companies. Ironically, the enforcement 
of this Act against four companies served to burst the bubble, 
and speculators rushed to sell. By December of 1720, South 
Sea stock was trading at 12 0.
The Company was bankrupt, and had no real quality assets 
to begin with, but speculators were not cognizant of this as 
the market began to feed on itself. This episode was, in 
relation to the Mississippi Bubble, short-lived. The 
difference being that the Bank of England, in an effort to 
raise needed liquidity, began calling in loans, not to mention 
not making new ones, and also offering interest bearing notes 
to depositors, the equivalent of selling certificates of
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deposit in modern banking. John Law, with his Royal Bank, had 
taken the opposite strategy, by creating money to support the 
shares, which only prolonged the Mississippi Bubble crisis.
The explanation for the cause of speculative bubbles 
comes to us by examining the Austrian school's theory of the 
trade cycle. This theory, formulated by second generation 
Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek, 
in fact has its roots, according to Mises (1983, 1) with the 
English "Currency School." Unfortunately, the Currency School 
did not realize that unbacked bank accounts were equivalent to 
unbacked bank notes in terms of expanding excessive credit. 
Thus, as the Bank of England was forced to suspend payment on 
numerous occasions, it appeared that the Currency School's 
explanation of the trade cycle was erroneous, and the view 
that the trade cycle had nothing to do with money or credit, 
but instead Keynes' "animal spirits," came to the fore.
The key point of the Austrian trade theory is that an 
increase in the supply of money engenders an economic "boom" 
followed subsequently by the correction of that ma1investment, 
or "bust", which is characterized by less money or credit. 
The business cycle is initially generated by some sort of 
monetary intervention in the market, typically in the modern
world by bank credit expansion to business. However, this
monetary intervention could be in the form of the following, 
listed by Haberler (1983, 9):
a) An increase of gold and legal tender money.
b) An increase of banknotes.
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c) An increase of bank deposits and bank credits.
d) An increase in the circulation of checks, 
bills, and other means of payment which are 
regularly or occasionally substituted for 
ordinary money.
e) An increase of the velocity of circulation of 
one or all these means of payments.
People, as they earn money, spend some on consumption, 
keep some in cash balances, while the rest is saved or 
invested in capital or production. For most people, this 
means setting aside a portion of their income by buying 
stocks, bonds or bank certificates of deposits or savings 
accounts. People determine the amount they wish to put in 
savings by their time preferences, i.e., the measure of their 
preference for present as opposed to future consumption. The 
less they prefer consumption in the present, the lower their 
time preference. The collective time preferences for all 
savers determines the pure interest rate. Thus, the lower the 
time preference, the lower the pure rate of interest. This 
lower time-preference rate leads to greater proportions of 
investment to consumption, and therefore an extension of the 
production structure, serving to increase total capital. 
Conversely, higher time preferences do the opposite, with high 
interest rates, truncation of the production structure, and an 
abatement of capital. The final array of various market 
interest rates are composed of the pure interest rate plus 
purchasing power components and the range of entrepreneurial 
risk factors. But the key component of this equation is the 
pure interest rate.
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When a monetary intervention, as talked about above,
occurs, the effect is the same as if the collective time
preferences of the public had fallen. The amount of money
available for investment increases, and with this greater
supply, interest rates fall. In turn, entrepreneurs respond
to what they believe is an increase in savings, or a decrease
in time preferences. These entrepreneurs then invest this
capital in "higher orders" in the structure of production,
which are further from the final consumer. Investment
then shifts from consumer goods to capital goods industries.
Prices and wages are bid up in these capital goods industries.
But the money does not immediately go into production, as
Mises (1978, 161) writes:
The moderated interest rate is intended to 
stimulate production and not to cause a stock 
market boom. However, stock prices increase first 
of all. At the outset, commodity prices are not 
caught up in the boom. There are stock exchange 
booms and stock exchange profits. Yet, the
"producer" is dissatisfied. He envies the 
"speculator" his "easy profit." Those in power are 
not willing to accept this situation. They believe 
that production is being deprived of money which is 
flowing into the stock market. Besides, it is 
precisely in the stock market boom that the serious 
threat of a crisis lies' hidden.
This shift to capital goods industries would be fine if 
people's time preferences had actually lessened. But this is 
not the case. As the newly created money quickly permeates 
from business borrowers to wages, rents, and interest, the 
recipients of these higher incomes will spend the money in the 
same proportions of consumption-investment as they did before.
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Thus, demand quickly turns from capital goods back to consumer
goods. Unfortunately, capital goods producers now have an
increased amount of goods for sale and no corresponding
increase in demand from their entrepreneurial customers.
This wasteful malinvestment is then liquidated, typically
termed a crash, bust or crisis, which is the market's way of
purging itself, the first step back to health. The ensuing
recession or depression is the market's adjustment period from
the malinvestments back to the normal efficient service
of customer demands.
This process or cycle can occur in a relatively short
period of time. However, the booms are sometimes prolonged by
more doses of monetary intervention. The greater the monetary
expansion, both in magnitude and length of time, the longer
the boom will be sustained (as was the case with the
Mississippi Bubble).
The recovery phase, or recession will weed out
inefficient and unprofitable businesses that were possibly
engendered by, or propped up by the money induced boom. The
recovery is also characterized by an increase in the "natural
rate" or pure rate of interest. In other words, time
preferences increase, which leads to a fall in the prices of
higher-order goods in relation to those of consumer goods. As
Rothbard (1983a, 21) writes:
Not only prices of particular machines must fall, 
but also the prices of whole aggregates of capital, 
e.g., stock market and real estate values. In 
fact, these values must fall more than the earnings
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from the assets, through reflecting the general
rise in the rate of interest return.
In the final analysis, monetary intervention cannot 
increase the supply of real goods, it merely diverts capital 
from avenues the market would dictate, towards wasteful 
malinvestment. The boom created has no solid base, and thus 
"it is illusory prosperity" (Mises, 1978, 183) .
The three episodes, addressed in this paper, are examples 
of malinvestment at, in retrospect, its most ludicrous. All 
were created by different examples of monetary intervention. 
The Tulipmania was engendered and fueled by a massive influx 
of specie into Amsterdam, see Haberler's "a" above. The 
Mississippi Bubble was driven by a blizzard of John Law's 
paper, see "b" and "d" above. The South Sea Bubble was formed 
by the modern banking tools of deposits and credits, along 
with increasing, as Murphy (1986, 73) relates: "the velocity 
of circulation of money by lending money to potential 
purchasers of its stock," see "c" and "e" above.
All three objects of speculation were equally dubious in 
terms of their investment value. With all due respect to Mr. 
Garber, in no way can a cogent argument be made to support how 
the value of a tulip bulb could be greater than the land it is 
grown in. John Law's Mississippi Company had the appearance 
of a powerful company, but the majority of its assets were the 
debts of a bankrupt country. As Wagner (1980, 13) apply puts, 
"Counterfeiting becomes a profitable activity, one that the 
state customarily tries to reserve for its own use." This
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counterfeiting was Law's only asset, but as we learned from 
Mises, it cannot create real prosperity. The South Sea 
Company, similar to the Mississippi Company, was capitalized 
with government debt, and was technically bankrupt.
The bust, in all three cases, served to liquidate the 
malinvestments, the break being sharper in the Tulipmania and 
South Sea cases. In both these cases a sound money 
alternative was available for capital to flee to. In the 
Mississippi Bubble case, the only alternative to Law's 
worthless stock was his worthless currency. The ensuing 
recessions were painful, although short, and
in the case of France engendered a healthy distrust of paper
money which served that country well. In the case of
England's handling of the South Sea episode, a mistake was
made in not allowing the full brunt of the crisis to be played
out. This is a mistake that has been and continues to be
repeated constantly throughout history. In times of financial
panic a "lifeboat operation" is employed. As Mises (1978,
142) explains:
If the crisis were ruthlessly permitted to run its 
course, bringing about the destruction of 
enterprises which were unable to meet their 
obligations, then all entrepreneurs-not only banks 
but also other businessmen-would exhibit more 
caution in granting and using credit in the future. 
Instead, public opinion approves of giving 
assistance in the crisis. Then, no sooner is the 
worst over, than the banks are spurred on to a new 
expansion of circulation credit.
Robert Walpole was possibly the originator of the "life 
boat operation" in 1721, and his legacy continues to live on
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in a modern world were we have unbacked fiat currency and 
central banking expanding and contracting (mostly expanding) 
the supply of money at every political whim. Thus, we live 
from one speculative bubble, or economic boom to the next 
resounding crash, only to reinflate the supply of money, 
serving to maintain a shaky scaffolding under inefficient 
enterprise and bloated governments, forestalling the 
inevitable complete bust.
Modern history is riddled with the occurrence of 
speculative bubbles and their inevitable crashes: Britain's 
railroad mania, the 1929 and 1987 stock market booms and 
subsequent crashes in the United States, Japan's stock market 
and property booms in the late 1980's. The common factor to 
all has been a monetary intervention or tremendous increase in 
the supply of money, ultimately leading to these 
ma1investments. These bubbles also share the common trait 
that the object or manifestation of the monetary intervention 
was a familiar investment instrument, i.e., stocks and/or real 
estate; nothing as obscure as tulips, until recently that is, 
when the boom in China's stamp market was recently revealed.1 
The genesis for this bubble? Money, of course: it is
estimated that savings deposits in China have grown to one 
trillion yuan. This vast increase in the supply of money has 
forced interest rates on bank savings accounts down to less 
than two per cent! Thus, speculators and others have turned 
to stamps, pushing the price of some stamps up five-hundred
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per cent in a two year period.
With no contraction of China's monetary policy, the only 
thing that has stopped China's only free market is government 
coercion. The Chinese authorities began a crackdown to 
attempt to close down the market last November 9th. Now 
Beijing's Yuetan Park is quiet, after being a site of trading 
activity as frenzied as that of the taverns of 17th century 
Amsterdam, of Paris' Rue Quincampoix, or of London's Exchange 
Alley. But too much money must go somewhere, and China's 
stamp speculators are now trying to guess what the object of 
China's next bubble will be, stocks2 or antiques.
As long as we live in a world in which the supply of 
money is being manipulated by governments, rather than set by 
the free and unfettered market, monetary interventions will 
continue to be the norm. Although much time has passed since 
the occurence of the three episodes discussed in this paper, 
the laws of economics do not change with time. The 
consequences of monetary interventions have always been and 
will continue to be; booms and subsequent busts. Speculative 
bubbles are the ultimate manifestation of these monetary 
induced booms. It is impossible to know what the object 
of the next speculative bubble will be, or exactly when it 
will occur. What has been shown in this paper is that these 
bubbles, or malinvestments are engendered by increases in the 
supply of money, with the ensuing busts inevitably to follow; 
leading once again to bankruptcys and financial pain, as these
wasteful investments are converted to more productive assets. 
What can be predicated with absolute accuracy is that fiat 
money, fractional reserve banking, central banks, Keynesian 
monetary policies and self-serving politicians will combine to 
ensure that there will be many more booms and specualtive 
bubbles for future economists and historians to chronical.
CHAPTER NOTES
1. See "China Cancels Its Red-Hot Stamp Market, But Traders Hope 
Crackdown Will Pass", by James McGregor. Wall Street Journal. 
December 19, 1991. pg. Cl.
2. China has two stock exchanges, one in Shanghai, the other in 
Shenzhen. McGregor (WSJ, Cl) indicates that 15 new stock listings 
were to be added to the existing 14 already trading on the 
exchange.
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